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OPACITY OF EXTREME LIQUIDITY RISK
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ABSTRACT
After 150 years of business, Lehman Brothers ran out of cash and credit and filed
for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. As a publicly traded company, Lehman had
filed all the reports required by U.S. securities law. But the hundreds of pages of words
and numbers provided no timely warning of lurking liquidity death. The risks of
triparty repurchase financing and the endgame Lehman would have to play if a selfmagnifying credit drain hit were, as it turned out, inherently opaque. Disclosure, the
traditional securities law “fix,” was destined to fail in this case, raising the question of
whether it might fail in others as well.
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INTRODUCTION
In the financial world, a liquidity crisis is a heart attack.1 When a financial firm
does not have the cash it needs to operate, it dies. In 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings
Inc. (Lehman) suffered such a fatal cash crisis, cardiac arrest.2 Those who owned
Lehman common stock lost virtually everything.3
Lehman’s stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange.4 Lehman therefore
filed the complete package of extensive disclosure documents required by federal
securities laws.5 Yet all the words and numbers in those filings failed to alert investors
to a significant probability that the company would suffer a liquidity death. This Article
asks why, and the answer is not encouraging: extreme liquidity risk is inherently
opaque. It is impossible to disclose it, in a timely way, to investors.
Section I describes Lehman’s demise, concentrating on triparty repurchase
transactions that drained Lehman of liquidity and the failure of last-ditch efforts to
orchestrate a merger that would have saved something for the shareholders. Section II
explains that Lehman’s disclosures provided virtually no warning of the risks inherent
in the repurchase deals or the endgame that Lehman would play out as it died. Section
III derives lessons learned from Lehman’s experience—in particular that the disclosure
failure was inevitable.6

1. See Report of Anton R. Valukas at 1402, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (JMP)
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Examiner Report] (quoting witness’s assertion that corporations
that go bankrupt die of “cancer,” but “financial firms [like Lehman] die of heart attacks” caused by a liquidity
crisis); id. (quoting an internal Lehman email asserting that investment banks “go bankrupt . . . because they
run out of financing, not because the value of their assets falls below the value of their liabilities”).
2. Id. at 1401–02.
3. Lehman’s stock price closed at twenty-one cents per share on September 15, 2008, the first trading
day after the firm filed for bankruptcy, and the stock was trading at eight cents by October 15, 2008. These and
all other Lehman stock prices are taken from the S&P Capital IQ data on file with author and Temple Law
Review [hereinafter S&P CAPITAL IQ DATABASE].
4. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Jan. 29, 2008) [hereinafter Lehman
2007 10-K]. All citations to securities filings include filing dates. Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. issued the
publicly traded stock. That holding company owned a broker-dealer subsidiary named Lehman Brothers Inc.
Id. at 5. Unless otherwise stated, this Article uses “Lehman” to refer to the holding company.
5. Section 12(a) of the Securities Exchange Act prohibits brokers from trading stocks through a national
securities exchange unless the stocks are registered under that Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a) (2012). Companies
registering stock must file Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a11; 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13. With exceptions not applicable here, they must also file proxy statements when
they solicit the right to vote stockholders’ shares. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2; 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-101.
6. This Article does not address the contention that Lehman was insolvent before 2008 because its
Aurora subsidiary originated and sold Alt-A loans; Lehman sold those loans on through securitizations; and
Lehman recognized neither the losses on the Alt-A loans it held nor the liability created by those it sold. See
Public Policy Issues Raised by the Report of the Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 122, 126–27 (2010) (statement of William K. Black, Associate Professor of
Economics & Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City). That view derives lessons, id. at 132–39, 141–44,
that are different from those that this Article draws, as this Article concentrates on the risks created by the
nature of triparty repurchase transactions and the endgame that Lehman—like other financial institutions at the
time—played out as it lost its life.
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WHAT HAPPENED TO LEHMAN

This Section tracks Lehman through 2008, from a promising beginning to
complete disaster. This Section then focuses on two factors that contributed to
Lehman’s collapse—liquidity declines forced by counterparties in triparty repurchase
agreements (repos) and unsuccessful efforts to find, with the assistance of the U.S.
government, a lifesaving merger as Lehman went down.
A.

The Short Story and the Big Picture

As 2008 opened, five firms dominated United States investment banking.7
Lehman was one. Bear Stearns (Bear) was another. Lehman appeared stable, having
closed its 2007 fiscal year with profits of $4.192 billion compared with $4.007 billion
the year before.8 Bear looked shaky with 2007 profits totaling only $233 million, an
almost ninety percent decline from the more than $2 billion the firm earned in 2006.9
In March 2008, Bear collapsed.10 Its liquidity—access to funds necessary to run
its business—dropped from $18 billion on Monday, March 10, to virtually nothing by
Friday, March 14.11 As the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission later concluded, “Bear
had run out of cash in one week.”12
Nevertheless, Bear survived in an altered form through a government-assisted
merger. On Thursday, March 13, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (the Fed)
made an emergency loan to JPMorgan Chase (JPM) so that JPM could loan the money
to Bear,13 and the Treasury Secretary told the Bear CEO, “You’re in the government’s
hands now.”14 On Friday evening, March 14, the Fed told Bear that the emergency
funding would end that weekend and that Bear had only Saturday and Sunday to make
a lifesaving deal.15 The government selected JPM as the merger partner for that deal,16

7. ROBERT W. KOLB, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF OUR TIME 87–88 (2011).
8. Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4, at 85. Lehman’s fiscal year ran from each December 1 to the
following November 30. Id. at 1.
9. The Bear Stearns Cos., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-5 (Jan. 29, 2008).
10. For useful summaries of Bear’s collapse, see the “Background to the Merger” section of Bear’s
proxy statement seeking shareholder approval of the Bear-JPM merger. The Bear Stearns Cos., Definitive
Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 27–36 (Apr. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Bear Proxy Statement]; see also
WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS: A TALE OF HUBRIS AND WRETCHED EXCESS ON WALL STREET 3–168
(2009); NAT’L COMM’N ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. AND ECON. CRISIS IN THE U.S., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
INQUIRY REPORT 280–91 (2011), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcicreports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf [hereinafter FCIC REPORT].
11. FCIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 289 & fig.15.1, 478.
12. Id. at 288. Bear’s treasurer later said, “It really went from Wednesday morning to Thursday
afternoon, twenty-four hours from solvent to dead.” COHAN, supra note 10, at 60.
13. Bear Proxy Statement, supra note 10, at 28; Bear Stearns, JPMorgan Chase, and Maiden Lane LLC,
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS. (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/refor
m_bearstearns.htm.
14. HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK 103 (2010).
15. Bear Proxy Statement, supra note 10, at 29; PAULSON, supra note 14, at 105.
16. PAULSON, supra note 14, at 105 (describing Paulson’s call to the JPM CEO at 4:30 p.m. on Friday,
March 14, in which the Secretary told JPM that “we needed to get the deal done by the end of the weekend”);
id. at 107 (“Under normal circumstances, I would have preferred to find multiple potential bidders to at least
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and, throughout that weekend, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Fed President
Timothy Geithner urged the merger on JPM.17 Ultimately, JPM agreed to buy Bear for
about $10 per share.18 The government made the merger possible by loaning $29
billion to a new limited liability company called Maiden Lane, which bought those
Bear assets that JPM refused to take.19 The Bear board approved the merger on March
24, 2008.20
As Bear agonized through its crisis, Lehman announced on March 18 that it had
earned $489 million in the first quarter of its 2008 fiscal year—a profit, but far below
the $1.15 billion it earned in the same quarter the previous year.21 Lehman also
disclosed a $1.8 billion reduction in asset values (a write-down).22 The second quarter
was worse, with Lehman projecting on June 9 and announcing on June 16 a $2.8 billion
loss together with a $3.7 billion write-down.23 On September 10, Lehman published
preliminary third-quarter figures showing a further $3.9 billion loss and an additional
$5.6 billion write-down.24
Bad as they were, these accounting losses did not drive Lehman directly to its
death. They contributed to lenders’ loss of confidence.25 But so did announcements on

create the semblance of competition. But I didn’t believe there was another buyer for Bear Stearns anywhere in
the world—and certainly not one that could get a deal done in 36 hours.”).
17. Id. at 106–07.
18. Bear Proxy Statement, supra note 10, at 30–36.
19. Bear Stearns, JPMorgan Chase, and Maiden Lane LLC, supra note 13. JPM also loaned “roughly $1
billion to Maiden Lane in a loan that [was] subordinated to the loan from the [Federal Reserve Bank of New
York] for repayment purposes.” Id. JPM would thus “take the first $1 billion loss on the Bear portfolio.”
PAULSON, supra note 14, at 120.
20. Bear Proxy Statement, supra note 10, at 38.
21. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), Ex. 99.1 (Press Release) 1, 8, 13 (Mar. 18,
2008) [hereinafter Lehman Press Release Mar. 18, 2008]; Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Conference Call: First
Quarter Earnings 3 (Erin Callan, CFO) (Mar. 18, 2008) (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter Lehman
First Quarter Conference Call]; see also Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 4
(Apr. 9, 2008) [hereinafter Lehman 1Q 10-Q] (comparing Lehman’s 2008 first quarter income to its 2007 first
quarter income). Seeking Alpha maintains the text of the Lehman conference calls cited in this Article. LEH,
SEEKING ALPHA, http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/LEH/transcripts (last visited July 8, 2014). The author
downloaded the text of the calls into Word documents, then formatted and paginated those documents. The
cited page numbers are those from the Word documents retained by the author.
22. Lehman Press Release Mar. 18, 2008, supra note 21, at 13; Lehman 1Q 10-Q, supra note 21, at
53–54; Lehman First Quarter Conference Call, supra note 21, at 5 (Erin Callan, CFO). The write-down figure
in the text here and elsewhere is the valuation reduction net of what Lehman called the “impact of certain
economic risk mitigation strategies.” Lehman Press Release Mar. 18, 2008, supra note 21, at 13; Lehman 1Q
10-Q, supra note 21, at 54.
23. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), Ex. 99.1 (Press Release) 1, 7, 9 (June 9,
2008) [hereinafter Lehman Press Release June 9, 2008]; Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Current Report (Form
8-K), Ex. 99.1 (Press Release) 1, 99.2 (Attach. I) (June 16, 2008) [hereinafter Lehman Press Release June 16,
2008]; Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 4, 68 (July 10, 2008) [hereinafter
Lehman 2Q 10-Q]; Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Conference Call: Second Quarter Earnings 5 (Ian Lowitt,
CFO) (June 16, 2008) (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter Lehman Second Quarter Conference Call].
24. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), Ex. 99.1 (Press Release) 1, 10, 99.2
(Attach. I) (Sept. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Lehman Press Release Sept. 10, 2008]. As a result of its bankruptcy,
Lehman never filed a Form 10-Q for this quarter.
25. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 16.
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September 9 and 10 that credit rating agencies were reviewing Lehman for a possible
downgrade.26 So did September 9 and 10 press reports that a possible infusion of
money from Korean investors had definitively fallen through.27 In the end, it was lack
of ready cash that sent the firm to the morgue. As the court-appointed examiner put it
after an exhaustive study, Lehman filed bankruptcy on September 15 because it “no
longer had sufficient liquidity to fund its daily operations.”28
Lehman’s collapse provides the case study for this Article. Bear’s near collapse
provides the context. The Article now turns to two particular factors that drove
Lehman’s liquidity crisis: triparty repurchase agreements and endgame failure.
B.

Triparty Repurchase Agreements

In 2008, U.S investment banking firms relied extensively on repos.29 Lehman’s
capital structure included billions of dollars of repo financing.30 At the end of its
second quarter in 2008, Lehman financed almost thirty percent of all its assets by
triparty repos.31
1.

How Repos Worked

In a repo transaction, a seller or borrower (typically a broker-dealer or a hedge
fund) sold a basket of securities to a buyer, and the seller promised to repurchase the
securities at a future date.32 Economically, a repo transaction functioned as a secured
loan.33 Thus, when the dealer or hedge fund sold the securities, it received (or
effectively borrowed) cash from the buyer (lender). When the dealer or hedge fund
bought the securities back, it paid a larger sum of cash, with the difference effectively

26. Fitch Places Lehman Brothers on Rating Watch Negative, FITCHRATINGS (FitchRatings, New York,
N.Y.), Sept. 9, 2008; Blaine A. Frantz & Robert Young, Moody’s Places Lehman’s A2 Rating on Review with
Direction Uncertain, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE (Moody’s, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 10, 2008; Scott
Sprinzen & Tanya Azarchs, Lehman Brothers Ratings Placed on Watch Negative; Capital-Raising Uncertainty
Cited, RATINGSDIRECT (Standard & Poor’s, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 9, 2008.
27. Susanne Craig et al., Lehman Faces Mounting Pressures, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 2008, at A1.
28. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 12. The Examiner’s attorneys reviewed “approximately
34,000,000 pages of documents,” “interviewed more than 250 individuals,” and retained a financial analysis
firm. Id. at 29, 32, 36. Not including appendices, the report covers 2,209 pages, with 8,197 footnotes.
29. At the end of the second quarter of 2008, Lehman financed 46% of the financial instruments it
owned through repos or repo-equivalent transactions, with the percentages for the other major investment
banks as follows: 50% (Morgan Stanley), 39% (Goldman Sachs), 28% (Merrill Lynch), and 55% (Bear
Stearns). DARRELL DUFFIE, HOW BIG BANKS FAIL AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 30, 31 tbl.3.1 (2011).
30. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 3 (“Lehman funded itself through the short-term repo markets
and had to borrow tens or hundreds of billions of dollars in those markets each day from counterparties to be
able to open for business.”).
31. See Lehman 2Q 10-Q, supra note 23, at 5 (stating that Lehman had $639.432 billion in assets at end
of quarter); id. at 84 (stating that Lehman had $188 billion in triparty repos).
32. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., TRI-PARTY REPO INFRASTRUCTURE REFORM 5 (2010).
33. See Viral V. Acharya & T. Sabri Öncü, The Repurchase Agreement (Repo) Market, in REGULATING
WALL STREET 319, 321 (Viral V. Acharya et al. eds., 2011) (stating that “repos are essentially secured loans”);
see also Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4, at 87 (referring to “[s]ecurities sold under agreements to
repurchase” as “[c]ollateralized financings”); Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 797–98 (“Lehman’s electronic
accounting systems automatically treated all repo transactions as financing transactions, i.e., borrowings.”).
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constituting interest on the loan.34 The percentage of that repurchase payment over the
amount the buyer paid for the securities was called the interest rate or the repo rate. 35
During the term of the repo, the seller in a sense “owed” the buyer the amount that the
seller had agreed to pay to repurchase the securities.36 The basket of securities, while
owned by the buyer, served as collateral in this loan-like transaction because, if the
seller/borrower failed to repurchase, the buyer/lender could sell the securities and use
the proceeds to cover or reduce its loss on the loan.37 In accordance with industry
practice, this Article refers to the seller as the borrower and the buyer as the lender.
To protect itself against the possibility that repoed securities would not sell for
their stated value and therefore fully cover the loan if the borrower did not repurchase,
the lender typically imposed a “haircut”—loaning to the borrower an amount of cash
below the market (or, if there was no market, estimated) value of the securities at the
time of purchase.38 For example, if a lender loaned a borrower $90 by paying $90 to
buy a basket of securities valued at $100, the lender thereby imposed a 10% haircut.
The haircut protected not only against the possibility that the market value of the
securities might fall during the term of the repo deal,39 but also against the possibility
that the borrower and the lender had overvalued the securities when agreeing to the
repo deal, as might happen if the securities were not trading in an active market so that
their value was uncertain.40 The haircut accounted as well for the possibility that the
securities might prove difficult to sell quickly, as might be true if they were thinly
traded.41
The haircuts therefore differed for different categories of securities according to
the risk that the type of security was mispriced, the risk that it might lose its value
during the repo’s term, or the risk that it might be difficult to quickly sell. Thus, the
haircut for U.S. Treasuries was quite low, because Treasuries had little risk of being
mispriced or suddenly losing value and could be immediately sold into an organized
market, while other securities—such as those providing payments from a pool of
residential mortgages or commercial loans—carried a greater mispricing risk, were
harder to sell,42 and accordingly were subject to larger haircuts.43
34. Andrew W. Lo, Reading About the Financial Crisis: A Twenty-One-Book Review, 50 J. ECON. LIT.
151, 158 n.12 (2012) (book review).
35. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 32, at 5.
36. Lo, supra note 34, at 158 n.12.
37. Kenneth D. Garbade, The Evolution of Repo Contracting Conventions in the 1980s, 12 ECON. POL’Y
REV. 27, 27–28 (2006).
38. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1091–92.
39. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 32, at 5.
40. See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on the Repo, 104 J. FIN.
ECON. 425, 444 (2012) (“Higher haircuts could . . . adjust for the uncertain value of the collateral . . . .”)
(emphasis added)).
41. ADAM COPELAND ET AL., THE TRI-PARTY REPO MARKET BEFORE THE 2010 REFORMS 22 (2010)
[hereinafter COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET] (“[M]ore liquid securities are easier to sell quickly, [are] more
able to [sell into a market that can] absorb a large increase in supply and [are] thus less prone to firesale prices
. . . . Therefore, collateral which is considered more liquid will typically receive lower haircuts.”).
42. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1091–92.
43. ADAM COPELAND ET AL., REPO RUNS: EVIDENCE FROM THE TRI-PARTY REPO MARKET 12–13, 32
tbl.II (2013) [hereinafter COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE]; id. at 51 n.1 (explaining that the article uses the
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None of the risks inherent in the different types of collateral matured unless the
borrower defaulted. Hence, haircuts for the same collateral varied from dealer to dealer,
reflecting lenders’ conclusions that some dealers were greater default risks than
others.44
a.

Bilateral Repos

Financial firms engaged in both bilateral repos and triparty repos. Figure 1
diagrams a bilateral repo—one simply between a borrower and a lender—in two
steps.45
Step 1. The borrower sold $100 worth of securities to the lender for $98, with the
$2 difference constituting a 2% haircut. The borrower promised in this example to buy
the securities back at the end of thirty days, which constituted the term of the repo.46
The borrower agreed to a repurchase price equal to the $98 loaned, plus 1% interest
(the repo rate). To implement this agreement in Step 1, the borrower transferred
ownership of the securities to the lender, and the lender sent the cash to the borrower.
Step 2. At the end of the 30-day loan, the lender sold the securities back to the
borrower. The borrower paid the lender $98.082, with the $0.082 equal to 1% annual
interest on $98 multiplied by the percentage of one year covered by the loan.47
Figure 1: Bilateral Repo
$100 Repo at 1% Rate and 2% Haircut for 30 Days
1

2

Borrower Sells $100 of Securities to Lender for $98 in Cash
Securities
Borrower
Cash

Lender

After 30 Days, Borrower Pays $98 Plus $0.082 in Interest to Lender to
Repurchase Securities
Cash
Lender
Borrower
Securities

term “margin” in this revision instead of “haircut” to measure overcollateralization); see also COPELAND,
TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 47 fig.7 (showing the median haircut—from the beginning of July 2008
up to Lehman’s bankruptcy on September 15, 2008—for U.S. Treasuries just under 2%, for debentures issued
by federal agencies about 2%, for mortgage-backed securities issued by such agencies a bit over 2%, for other
Fed-eligible securities a little higher but under 3%, and for nonFed eligible securities at about 5%).
44. COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 13–14, 43–47 (Apx. C).
45. This figure largely duplicates the one found in FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 32, at 5.
46. In the trade, the term was called the “tenor.” Adam Copeland et al., Key Mechanics of the U.S.
Tri-Party Repo Market, 18 ECON. POL’Y REV. 17, 21 (Nov. 2012) [hereinafter Copeland, Key Mechanics]. This
Article uses “term” as more intuitive.
47. See id. at 21 n.9 (describing rate calculation). One percent of $98 is $0.98. The percentage of one
year covered by the loan is 8.33% or 30/360. Figure 1 rounds the interest payment to the nearest tenth of a
cent.
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Triparty Repos

The repos on which this Article focuses, however, were not bilateral, but triparty
repos. Triparty repos included a clearing bank as the third party. A description of a
2008 triparty repo financing over forty-eight hours provides an accessible
understanding of this financing mechanism.48 Figure 2 diagrams that financing in seven
steps.49 Assume for this example an overnight term and that the borrower was a
securities dealer.50
Step 1. The dealer and a lender agreed—before 10:00 a.m. on Day 151—on a repo
for the coming night.52 The agreement included the amount of cash that the lender
would provide, the overnight term of the loan, the repo rate, the acceptable securities to
be repoed (the collateral), and the haircuts on the collateral.53 The acceptable
collateral54 was defined by categories of securities, with agreements often permitting
more than one category,55 different haircuts for different categories,56 and sometimes a
percentage limit on different categories.57 The repos were therefore “general collateral”
transactions in which the borrowing dealer could provide any securities that fit into the
categories on which the borrower and lender agreed.58 Although the dealer and the
lender agreed to the repo by 10:00 a.m., no particular securities were allocated to the
repo until trading ended.59
Assume that during that trading day, the dealer purchased Security A (either to
expand its inventory or to hold as an investment),60 financing that purchase in large part

48. The text describes triparty repos in 2008. See infra note 392 for a discussion of changes since that
time.
49. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 32, at app. I (illustrating this process through a
diagram).
50. See id. at 6 (stating that triparty borrowers were “typically fixed-income securities broker-dealers”).
51. This part of the transaction was bilateral. Id. at 9. The clearing bank played no role. COPELAND, TRIPARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 8.
52. See COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 41 (“A [lender] and a [borrower] typically
agree on a tri-party repo before 10 a.m. Conversations with market participants suggest that at least 90% of a
dealer’s tri-party repos are arranged before that time.”).
53. Id.
54. See COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 74 app. B (listing examples of collateral used
in triparty repos); PAYMENTS RISK COMM., TASK FORCE ON TRI-PARTY REPO INFRASTRUCTURE 19 (2010)
[hereinafter 2010 PAYMENTS RISK COMM.] (containing another list at a higher level of generalization).
55. 2010 PAYMENTS RISK COMM., supra note 54, at 37.
56. See COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 11–12 (providing three simplified schedules
of collateral and haircuts).
57. See Copeland, Key Mechanics, supra note 46, at 24 (providing as a simplified example the
following: “Only U.S. Treasuries, agency securities, and investment-grade, U.S.-dollar corporate bonds are
acceptable. No more than 30 percent of the portfolio may be corporate bonds.”).
58. Id. at 20, 21 n.11.
59. COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 41–42 (stating that the morning agreement
determines the “set of acceptable collateral,” but that trades settle with specific securities in the afternoon
allocation).
60. See COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 5 (“Dealers hold securities for several
reasons. Some securities constitute inventories as part of the dealer’s market-making business, others are part
of the proprietary holdings of the dealer as a form of investment.”).
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by a loan that the dealer had to repay at the close of business. The second panel of Step
1 in Figure 2 shows the purchase of Security A. It also shows the intraday loan used to
purchase Security A. Assume that the dealer planned to repay the loan with money
from a repo into which Security A would be placed.
When the markets closed,61 the dealer had many different repos to fill with
securities62 and many different securities, including the one just bought, that the dealer
hoped to place in repos. The dealer faced “a relatively high-dimensional and complex
mathematical programming problem,”63 which could be solved by allocating securities
among repos in a manner that maximized the dollars borrowed or minimized borrowing
costs.64
Step 2. At the point of this challenging allocation, the clearing bank swung into
action. The dealer kept all securities that might be used in triparty repo transactions—
including Security A—in one or more accounts at the clearing bank. The clearing bank
provided computer programs to help the dealer allocate securities among repo deals.65
Using those programs, perhaps supplemented with manual intervention by the dealer, 66
the dealer allocated its securities among repos and locked them into those deals
between 6:00 p.m. and 6:30 p.m.67 Assume that the dealer allocated Security A to the
example repo in Figure 2.
Step 3. Like the dealers, the lenders in the triparty repos had accounts at the
clearing bank.68 The clearing bank transferred the securities allocated to the example
repo (including Security A) from the dealer’s account to the lender’s account (because
the transaction took the form of a sale of the securities to the lender), and the clearing
bank transferred the cash being loaned from the lender’s account to the dealer’s
account.69 The dealer then used the cash from the repo to pay off the intraday loan that
the dealer had taken out to buy Security A.70
Step 4. In the morning of Day 2, the clearing bank “unwound” the transaction. All
repos were unwound before 8:30 a.m.—whether they were only for an overnight term
or for a term of days or weeks, or were open repos that continued automatically until
terminated by the lender or the dealer.71 In the unwind, the clearing bank transferred
61. See id. at 13 (stating that Fedwire closed at 3:30 p.m. and DTC at 4:30 p.m.).
62. See Copeland, Key Mechanics, supra note 46, at 23–24 (stating that a larger dealer may have triparty
repo relationships with twenty or more lenders, with each relationship potentially involving multiple deals on
any given day).
63. Id. at 23.
64. Id. at 26.
65. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1086; Copeland, Key Mechanics, supra note 46, at 24.
66. Copeland, Key Mechanics, supra note 46, at 26.
67. COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 42; Copeland, Key Mechanics, supra note 46, at
24.
68. Copeland, Key Mechanics, supra note 46, at 19.
69. COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 42.
70. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1087. In practice, since the newly purchased security would be
repoed with a haircut, the repo proceeds would not cover the entire intraday purchase loan, and the dealer
would have to use its own money to make up the difference.
71. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1112 (confirming that all of Lehman’s triparty
repos—including term repos—were unwound each morning); COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41,
at 13 (“All repos are unwound, including term[] repos and open repos that are rolled over . . . .”); FED.
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the securities from the lender’s account (including Security A) back to the dealer’s
account,72 which was essential as the dealer had to have the securities during the day in
order to conduct its business—the buying and selling of securities.73 And, very
importantly, the clearing bank repaid the lender in the unwind by directly or indirectly
transferring the clearing bank’s cash to the lender’s account.74 That repayment
constituted an advance—or intraday loan—by the clearing bank to the dealer during
Day 2.75 That transfer gave the lender immediate access to the cash, which was now in
the lender’s account at the clearing bank.76
Step 5. Of course, the dealer wanted to repo the securities again for the coming
night and would, in the morning of Day 2, make arrangements to do so.
Step 6. At the end of Day 2, the allocation process would proceed again, locking
Security A into another overnight repo.
Step 7. After that allocation, the clearing bank would transfer securities (including
Security A) to the repo lender, and, this time, the money from the lender would,
directly or indirectly, travel to the clearing bank’s own account to pay off the intraday
loan from the clearing bank to the dealer.77
c.

Continuous Funding Through Repos

Provided that lenders continually agreed to overnight repos in the same amount,78
the process could continue indefinitely (see the last panel in Figure 2). But the
particular securities used to collateralize even an open repo could change from day to
day, as the dealer’s inventory changed through daily purchases and sales. The only
restriction on this practice was the requirement that the repoed securities allocated to
each repo each night needed to fall within the categories permissible for that repo.79
Thus, Security A could be allocated at the end of Day 2 to a different basket of
securities than the basket to which it was allocated for a repo at the end of Day 1.

RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 32, at 9–10 (explaining that all unwinding occurred before 8:30 a.m. each
day).
72. Copeland, Key Mechanics, supra note 46, at 22.
73. Acharya & Öncü, supra note 33, at 328 (“The purpose of the unwind is to allow the dealer access to
the securities in its collateral pool to settle sales, which occur throughout the day.”).
74. The repayment to the lender could be made electronically from the clearing bank’s own account to
the lender’s account at the clearing bank, or made from the clearing bank’s own account to the dealer’s
account at the clearing bank, then on from the dealer’s account to the lender’s account.
75. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1418 (confirming that Lehman’s clearing bank advanced an
intraday loan to Lehman each day in the unwind of Lehman’s repos); PAYMENTS RISK COMM., TASK FORCE
ON TRI-PARTY REPO INFRASTRUCTURE: FINAL REPORT 5 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 PAYMENTS RISK COMM.]
(stating that the unwind “required the Clearing Banks to extend intraday credit to the Dealers from 8:30 in the
morning until all collateral allocations were finalized and ‘locked up,’ in the evening”).
76. ADAM COPELAND ET AL., POLICY ISSUES IN THE DESIGN OF TRI-PARTY REPO MARKETS
(PRELIMINARY) 26 (rev. 2011) [hereinafter COPELAND, POLICY ISSUES].
77. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 32, at 10.
78. This might happen by default. See Acharya & Öncü, supra note 33, at 322 (“Overnight repos
constitute about half of all repo transactions, and most of them are open; they roll over automatically until
either party chooses to exit.”).
79. COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 13.
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Note that, in the example, the dealer continuously financed its purchase of Security A.
When the dealer bought Security A on Day 1, the dealer did so with cash from an
intraday loan. The dealer paid off that Day 1 intraday loan with the proceeds of the loan
from the overnight repo. The dealer then paid off the repo loan with the Day 2 intraday
loan from the clearing bank, obtained in the unwind. And the dealer paid off that Day 2
intraday loan with the proceeds of the repo loan at the end of Day 2. This chain of loans
permitted the dealer to finance the purchase of Security A for the entire cycle and
provided the dealer with the advantages (and imposed the risks) of leverage.80
Figure 2: Triparty Repo
1

2

3

4

Dealer and Lender Agree to Overnight Repo
Dealer Buys Security A, Financing the Purchase with a Loan To
Be Repaid at the End of the Day
Allocation of Dealer Securities to This Repo, Including Security
A
REPO BEGINS
Lender Account
Dealer Account
Securities,
at
at
Including Security A
Clearing Bank
Clearing Bank
Cash
Used to Pay Off
Security A
Purchase Loan
REPO ENDS
with Unwind and Intraday Loan
Securities,
Lender Account
Dealer Account
Including Security A
at
at
Clearing Bank
Clearing Bank

Intraday Debt
Initiated
5
6

7

Clearing
Bank’s Own
Account

Allocation of Dealer Securities to This Repo, Including Security
A
REPO BEGINS
Dealer Account
Securities,
Lender Account
at
Including Security A
at
Clearing Bank
Clearing Bank
Clearing
Bank’s Own
Account

6:30 p.m.
Day 1

8:30 a.m.
Day 2

Cash

Dealer and Lender Agree to Overnight Repo

Intraday Debt
Paid Off

8:30–10:00 a.m.
Day 1
During Trading on
Day 1
3:30–6:30 p.m.
Day 1

8:30–10:00 a.m.
Day 2
3:30–6:30 p.m.
Day 2

6:30 p.m.
Day 2

Cash

Repeat Steps 4 Through 7

80. WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 8, 344–46 (11th ed. 2010).
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Haircuts and Collateral Cushion for the Clearing Bank

Before leaving the structure of triparty repos, both the morning unwind and the
associated intraday debt that the dealer owed to the clearing bank merit more
elaboration. While the unwind had the advantage of returning securities to the dealer so
that the dealer could use them during its business day, the clearing bank needed to
protect itself during the day—both on the intraday loan it extended to the dealer for
triparty repos and on any other daytime credit that the clearing bank provided to the
dealer, such as credit to buy new securities.81 The clearing bank did so through a lien
on securities that the dealer (and its affiliates, including its parent holding company)
had in accounts at the clearing bank.82
During the day, as the dealer bought and sold securities, the particular securities in
its accounts at the clearing bank changed continually.83 To control the relationship of
this shifting collateral to the amount of the intraday loan and other daytime credit, the
clearing bank employed a tool called net free equity (NFE).84 Essentially, NFE equaled
the amount by which the value of the securities in the dealer and affiliate accounts at
the clearing bank85 exceeded the amount the dealer had borrowed—including
particularly the amount borrowed through the intraday loan in the unwind—plus any
unused, unsecured credit the clearing bank was willing to extend.86
As long as NFE was positive, the dealer could call on the positive balance for
cash, but the clearing bank could refuse to execute any transaction to which the dealer
committed with a third party if consummation of that deal would drive NFE below
zero.87 Thus, NFE directly affected the amount of cash available to the dealer.
The NFE arrangement and related lien made the intraday loan from the clearing
bank to the dealer a secured loan. And just as the overnight lender needed to be sure
that the repo collateral was sufficient to cover the debt if the dealer defaulted on the
overnight loan, so the clearing bank needed to be sure that the collateral for its intraday
loan was sufficient to protect against a dealer default on that debt. To protect against
the possible insufficiency of the collateral, the clearing bank—like the overnight
lenders—might haircut the value of the securities in the dealer’s account, before
computing the value that those securities added to the dealer’s NFE. Dollar for dollar,
such haircuts reduced the dealer’s NFE, and therefore, dollar for dollar, those haircuts
reduced a dealer’s daytime liquidity.
81. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unwind process.
82. COPELAND, POLICY ISSUES, supra note 76, at 12 n.8. Thus, the Clearing Agreement between
Lehman’s broker-dealer subsidiary and JPM gave JPM “a continuing security interest in, lien upon and right of
set-off as to” accounts that the broker-dealer had at JPM. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1088. In 2008, the
Lehman holding company guaranteed the broker-dealer’s obligations and gave JPM a lien on the holding
company’s accounts at JPM to satisfy that guarantee. Id. at 1115–17. New agreements in August, and revisions
to those agreements in September, expanded the liens and the guarantee. Id. at 1151–52.
83. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 32, at 10.
84. COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 13–14.
85. The NFE calculation took into account all the securities that the dealer held in accounts at the
clearing bank, not just those securities financed by the repos. Copeland, Key Mechanics, supra note 46, at 26.
86. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1093 (describing NFE in the JPM-Lehman relationship).
87. See id. at 1094 (stating that “[i]f a trade would put Lehman’s NFE below zero, the trade would not be
permitted”).
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If the clearing bank concluded that haircuts imposed by overnight lenders did not
provide adequate protection, the clearing bank could impose higher haircuts during the
day. Moreover, the clearing bank might decide that it needed some extra cushion—
beyond haircuts on individual securities—to protect itself against the risk that the
dealer would fail to pay on the intraday loan. The clearing bank might reason that while
a particular overnight lender—one of maybe sixty88—took only a part of the risk that
the dealer would default overnight because that lender loaned against only part of the
dealer’s portfolio, the clearing bank during the day took the risk that the dealer would
default on the intraday loan that covered all of the dealer’s securities financed through
triparty repos with all lenders.89 That outsized risk might warrant a collateral cushion in
addition to haircuts.
Of course, a clearing bank could only impose haircuts and could only require a
collateral cushion if it had the power to work its will. The daily unwind provided that
power. A clearing bank was not contractually required to unwind in the morning. To
the contrary, the clearing bank possessed the discretion to unwind—and provide the
related intraday loan to the dealer—or not.90 A clearing bank’s refusal to unwind would
condemn a dealer to a swift and almost certain death, as without the unwind’s intraday
loan, the dealer would be unable to repay the overnight lenders and would therefore be
unable to repurchase the securities that were its stock in trade.91 The clearing bank’s
ability to virtually destroy a dealer by simply refusing to unwind gave the clearing bank
enormous bargaining power to demand haircuts and collateral cushions.92

88. Lehman borrowed from “over 60” lenders in the triparty market on September 8, 2008. COPELAND,
TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 56.
89. Id. at 43–44 (“The [clearing banks’] exposures to individual [dealers] were . . . very large: the largest
individual portfolio was over $400 billion . . . . This exposure implie[d] that if a large [dealer] were to fail
during the day, the clearing bank would have to take a massive amount of collateral on its balance sheet.”).
90. See id. at 14 (“It is important to highlight that the unwind [was] at the discretion of the clearing bank.
. . . [T]he clearing bank ha[d] the contractual right to refuse to unwind the repos . . . . For example, if a clearing
bank felt that a dealer might have to declare bankruptcy during the day, it could choose to protect itself by not
unwinding.”); Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1068 (“[JPM] acted as LBI’s [the Lehman broker-dealer
subsidiary] principal clearing bank pursuant to a Clearance Agreement between [JPM] and LBI. The most
significant component of [JPM’s] clearing services was ‘triparty repo’ clearing.”); id. at 1088 (“The Clearance
Agreement . . . provided for the extension of credit to LBI by [JPM], but at [JPM’s] sole discretion. [JPM]
could . . . ‘at any time decline to extend such credit at [JPM’s] discretion, with notice.’”).
91. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1135 (“One option available to [JPM] was to cease unwinding
triparty repos in the morning, which would result in [Lehman’s] default on payment obligations (causing
government securities not to trade and investors to lock up).”); COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note
41, at 14 (“Practically speaking, refusing to unwind the repos of a dealer would almost certainly force that
dealer into default.”).
92. Conversations between JPM and Lehman, during which JPM made its last demand for an additional
$5 billion in cash collateral, illustrate both parties’ appreciation of this power. JPM told Lehman that it would
not unwind the triparty repos the next day unless Lehman posted the cash. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at
1163. Lehman’s Treasurer rhetorically asked, “What is to keep you from asking for $10 billion tomorrow?” Id.
at 1162. JPM’s CEO “responded: ‘nothing’ and ‘maybe we will.’” Id. Lehman posted the $5 billion. Id. at
1165.

PREDICTING A HEART ATTACK

2014]

e.

479

Matched Book Repos

Before turning specifically to Lehman’s repo financing, it is critical to understand
one more transaction—this one involving both the bilateral repo market and the triparty
repo market. In addition to using repos to finance securities in inventory and held for
investment, a dealer might engage in “matched book” transactions.
In matched book transactions, the dealer loaned money to a counterparty, like a
hedge fund, in a bilateral repo transaction by which the dealer bought a security from
the hedge fund.93 The dealer then repoed that same security in the triparty market,
effectively using the money the dealer borrowed in the triparty deal to finance the loan
that it made to the hedge fund in the bilateral deal.94 This was profitable if the dealer
could borrow in the triparty market at a lower repo rate than the hedge fund would pay
in the bilateral market.95 It was also profitable if the dealer could lend in the bilateral
market on a repo with a larger haircut, then borrow at the same interest rate in the
triparty market through a deal with a smaller haircut—thereby effectively getting the
difference between the haircuts as free additional cash with which to work.96
Such matched book deals necessarily increased the amount that the dealer
borrowed in the triparty market. And if the haircut in the triparty leg was the same or
less than that in the bilateral leg, the dealer used none of its own cash in matched
transactions. Even better, provided the clearing bank did not haircut the securities
during the day to any greater extent than the lender in the triparty leg did during the
night, the transaction did not decrease the dealer’s NFE during the day.97 The matches

93. See Jeremy C. Stein, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York Workshop on Fire Sales as a Driver of Systemic Risk in Triparty Repo and Other
Secured Funding Markets 5–6, 8 (Oct. 4, 2013) (describing an example of a “matched book” deal).
94. See COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 14 (“To some extent, the securities that [a]
dealer[] obtain[ed] as collateral in the bilateral repo market [were] rehypothecated by the dealer and used as
collateral in the tri-party repo market. In these cases, the dealer’s role [was] to serve as an intermediary
between [lenders] in tri-party repo (e.g., money market mutual funds . . .) and a dealer’s prime-brokerage
clients (e.g., hedge funds).”); Arvind Krishnamurthy et al., Sizing Up Repo (forthcoming) (manuscript at 7) (on
file with author) (stating that dealer banks “use repos” in part “to finance repo loans they provided to clients
such as hedge funds,” “re-hypothecat[ing] the collateral they receive from hedge funds to use as collateral in
their repos with cash lenders”); id. at 8 (“Repos between . . . a dealer bank and a hedge fund are typically
bilateral, while repos between dealer banks and [cash lenders] are typically tri-party.”); id. at 16 (describing
linked deals in which “dealer bank A lends $1 to a hedge fund via a repo (collateralized by $1.02 of
Treasuries), and then borrows the $1 from dealer bank B via a repo (collateralized by the same $1.02 of
Treasuries), who then borrows $1 from a [money market fund] (collateralized by the same $1.02 of
Treasuries).”).
95. See COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 5 (“The broker dealer earn[ed] profits on the
difference between interest rates on the bilateral repo with the hedge fund and on the tri-party repo with the
cash [lender].”); Krishnamurthy et al., supra note 94, at 8 (repos in the bilateral and triparty markets may have
different repo rates).
96. See COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 5–6 (explaining that “if the haircut in tri-party
[was] lower than the haircut the broker dealer obtain[ed] from its client, then the broker dealer [was] able to
generate cash, which [could] be used to earn an additional return”); see also id. at 65, 66 fig.26 (showing the
difference between haircuts in the two markets, with the haircuts noticeably higher in the bilateral market for
all kinds of collateral other than Treasuries and with the spread greater for lower quality collateral).
97. See Copeland, Key Mechanics, supra note 46, at 26 (explaining that the effect of any haircuts is
included in the value of a dealer’s securities held in a clearing bank).

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

480

[Vol. 86

generated their own leverage, or, put another way, the matched transactions were pure
leverage deals.
2.

How Lehman’s Repos Went Wrong

Triparty repos allowed a dealer to finance its securities with debt.98 Moreover,
repo debt was comparatively cheap, as compared with long-term debt available through
the public market.99 But the structure of the repos gave both the clearing bank and the
lenders the power to squeeze the dealer’s liquidity. Lehman felt the squeeze from both
sides.
a.

Clearing Bank Demands for Haircuts and a Collateral Cushion

In the early 2000s, there were two principal clearing banks for triparty repo
transactions—JPM and the Bank of New York.100 A dealer typically selected only
one.101 Lehman selected JPM.102
Through February 2008, JPM extended the daily unwind loan to Lehman without
imposing any haircut on Lehman-owned securities for purposes of computing NFE.103
So Lehman had (through the NFE arrangement) more available cash with which to
work during the day than it had during the night.104
In early 2008, however, JPM came alive to the considerable risk it ran on the
intraday credit.105 The Fed urged JPM to consider this danger,106 and dealers’ increased
use of less liquid securities in repo financings further fueled JPM’s concern.107 JPM

98. See supra Part I.B.1.c.
99. Like haircuts, interest rates varied with the type of collateral, with repos using more risky securities
made at higher repo rates. In September 2008, Lehman paid just under 2% for repo financing secured by
Treasuries, between 2% and 2.1% for repos secured by agency debentures, and between 2.2% and 2.5% for
repos secured by corporate debt. COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 60 fig.22. All these rates,
however, were below what Lehman paid for debt or debt-like financing through public offerings. For example,
Lehman paid 6.75% on $1.5 billion in unsecured ten-year debt in December 2007 and 7.50% on $2 billion in
unsecured thirty-year debt in May 2008. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), Ex. 4.01
(Fifteenth Supplemental Indenture) 2 (Dec. 21, 2007); Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Current Report (Form 8K), Ex. 4.01 (Sixteenth Supplemental Indenture) 2 (May 13, 2008). Lehman also sold three series of preferred
stock in 2008, with various terms, paying 7.95% on the first sale, 7.25% on the second, and 8.75% on the third.
Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Feb. 12, 2008); Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.,
Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Apr. 4, 2008); Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2
(June 12, 2008).
100. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1085.
101. COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 9.
102. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1084.
103. Id. at 1094.
104. See id. at 1095–96 (“Before February 2008, [JPM] required no triparty-investor margin, so [JPM’s]
payment of $19 million cash in the morning to repay the lender (a cash advance for the benefit of Lehman) in
concert with the receipt of the $20 million of [repoed] securities would give Lehman an immediate $1 million
‘surplus’ of NFE.”).
105. Id. at 1094–95.
106. Id.
107. See Hearing on “Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government
Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis” Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry

2014]

PREDICTING A HEART ATTACK

481

therefore decided to impose haircuts during the day equal to those that the overnight
lenders required, and so advised Lehman on February 26, 2008.108 Beginning on March
17, 2008 (after Bear’s near death), JPM started with a daytime haircut equal to twenty
percent of the nighttime amount, planning to increase to the full overnight amount by
the end of June.109 JPM incorporated the haircuts into the NFE calculation, thereby
reducing Lehman’s available daytime cash.110
JPM then concluded that even daytime haircuts equal to the overnight haircuts did
not adequately protect JPM on the intraday loan. JPM reasoned that, “unlike any single
triparty [lender], [it] took on a [dealer’s] entire triparty repo book each day.”111
Moreover, as JPM saw it, the overnight haircuts did not “fully reflect” the risk that it
would be hard for JPM, in the event of a dealer default, to sell “the increasingly large
amount of structured, difficult-to-value securities that were being financed through the
triparty repo program.”112 Nor did those haircuts adequately account for the risk that a
dealer had overvalued repo-financed securities.113
On June 2, JPM accordingly advised Lehman that it needed about $6 billion in
extra collateral to both reach 100% of the haircut imposed by overnight lenders (up
from the 20% being covered at that time) and to provide a collateral cushion (that JPM
called a “risk-based margin”) to protect itself against these additional risks.114 In
response, Lehman posted $5 billion of collateral on June 19,115 with the difference
between the $6 billion demanded and the $5 billion posted probably explained by
JPM’s concession that Lehman could have an extension, from the end of June until
mid-August, of the deadline to reach 100% of the overnight haircuts.116 Just like the
daytime haircuts, the collateral cushion reduced Lehman’s NFE.117
Commission 242–43 (2010) [hereinafter FCIC Hearing] (statement of Barry Zubrow), available at http://fcicstatic.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0901-Transcript.pdf (“The triparty business was
originally . . . designed to help broker-dealers finance government and agency inventories. And we I think
collectively woke up as an industry and found at the end of ’07, beginning of ’08, that . . . a significant portion
of the financing . . . had shifted into less liquid, harder-to-value securities . . . .”).
108. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1095 (describing a February 2008 internal JPM recommendation
to impose daytime haircuts); id. at 1096–97 (“Lehman and [JPM] representatives discussed these new
collateral requirements . . . on a February 26, 2008 conference call. . . . [JPM] offered to implement this plan
‘incrementally.’”).
109. Id. at 1097–98; Barry Zubrow, Written Statement of Barry Zubrow Before the Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission 3 (Sept. 1, 2010), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcictestimony/2010-0901-Zubrow.pdf.
110. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1095–96.
111. Zubrow, supra note 109, at 3; see also Examiner Report, supra note 1, 1099 n.4009 (summarizing
an interview with a JPM collateral risk manager and stating: “[JPM’s] ‘concentration risk’ to the broker-dealer
borrower was much higher than that of any triparty [lender].”).
112. Zubrow, supra note 109, at 3–4.
113. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1099–1100 (describing JPM’s new “risk-based margin” as
taking into account “liquidation risk” to cover securities’ one-day price volatility and “price risk,” which is the
risk that illiquid securities are overpriced).
114. Id. at 1101–02.
115. Id. at 1102.
116. Zubrow, supra note 109, at 4; Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1104.
117. Initially, JPM imposed a $5 billion charge on NFE available to Lehman’s broker-dealer subsidiary.
Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1104 n.4030. But the Lehman holding company owned the securities posted
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In early July, Lehman posted another $1 billion.118 And, as time went by, Lehman
posted additional collateral, sometimes substituting one asset for another.119 By
September 4, Lehman had posted collateral that Lehman priced at about $8 billion to
protect JPM against risks posed by the intraday loans created by the triparty repo
unwind.120
In late August and early September, JPM disagreed with Lehman’s pricing
because some of the assets Lehman had posted consisted of “illiquid, structured debt
instruments.”121 In particular, Lehman had included collateralized debt obligations
(CDOs) that JPM’s outside valuation consultant determined were worth less than the
value Lehman assigned.122 When JPM told Lehman that such collateral was not
acceptable, Lehman responded that it was running out of unencumbered assets.123
On September 9, JPM nevertheless requested an additional $5 billion in collateral
from Lehman.124 Lehman posted $4.6 billion from September 9 through September 11,
with $3.6 billion of this in cash and money market funds.125 JPM then again
reconsidered its exposure to Lehman.126 Once more, JPM concluded that some of the
collateral Lehman had posted was not worth the values that Lehman used.127
JPM therefore decided that Lehman was still $5 billion short,128 and demanded on
September 11 that Lehman post that amount in cash—indisputably worth its stated
amount—by the morning of September 12, or JPM would not unwind.129 Lehman
scraped together and posted that money,130 and JPM unwound the triparties on the

to satisfy this collateral cushion demand, and when the holding company transferred the securities back to its
own account, JPM charged the $5 billion against the holding company’s NFE. Id. at 1104 n.4030, 1121–22;
Zubrow, supra note 109, at 4–5.
118. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1103.
119. Id. JPM sought, through this and other collateral demands, to protect itself on intraday exposure to
Lehman not only from the triparty repo unwind but also from other transactions. Zubrow, supra note 109, at
5–6. So the numbers are somewhat hard to relate to the repos. See infra note 129.
120. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1126.
121. Zubrow, supra note 109, at 5.
122. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1105–09.
123. Id. at 1106.
124. Id. at 1134, 1138.
125. Id. at 1141–43.
126. Id. at 1158–60.
127. Id. at 1159.
128. Id. at 1160.
129. FCIC Hearing, supra note 107, at 276; Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1161, 1163–65; Zubrow,
supra note 109, at 7. Although the $5 billion demand was linked directly to the triparty unwind, the amount
may also have reflected JPM’s concern over its exposure to Lehman on derivative transactions and novations.
Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1163; Zubrow, supra note 109, at 5. But those exposures seem modest in
comparison with the near $100 billion triparty intraday loan. Compare Zubrow, supra note 109, at 2 (stating
JPM’s intraday loans regularly totaled over $100 billion dollars), with Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1130
(referring to a September 5, 2008, internal JPM document setting JPM’s derivatives exposure to Lehman at
about $1.9 billion).
130. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1165; see also FCIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 333 (“Lehman
‘delivered the $5 billion in cash only by pulling virtually every unencumbered asset it could deliver’” (quoting
Lehman complaint against JPM in the bankruptcy)).
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morning of September 12,131 which was Lehman’s last business day before
bankruptcy.132 Even so, there was a serious question whether JPM would unwind on
Monday, September 15, as JPM was concerned that if it unwound, Lehman would be
unable to find overnight lenders and would therefore default on the September 15
intraday loan, leaving JPM with assets that might sell for less than the amount of that
loan.133
Dollar for dollar, the daytime haircuts and ever-increasing collateral cushion upon
which JPM insisted ate into Lehman’s NFE, reduced the amount of money that
Lehman could borrow from JPM each day to run its business, and eroded Lehman’s
liquidity.
b.

Flight by Lenders Who Proved Information Insensitive Until Shock

Turning from the clearing bank to the lenders, Lehman’s triparty repo borrowing
fell off a cliff. As Fed staffers later observed, “the collapse . . . was not at all gradual,
but rather concentrated in the week before the firm declared bankruptcy.”134 Indeed,
during that last week, the value of the securities Lehman posted as collateral in triparty
repos declined by about 37%,135 “from $150 billion funded by over 60 [lenders] on
September 8, 2008, to $95 billion funded by around 40 [lenders] on September 12, the
Friday before [the firm] filed for bankruptcy”—a $55 billion drop in secured
financing.136 And perhaps $21 billion of the $95 billion that remained was trapped in
multiday repos.137 The lenders on those repos may have wanted to get out but could not
because their repo contracts made a quick exit impossible.138
While it is difficult to untangle the impact of all the factors that could have
contributed to the large and sudden decline in Lehman’s triparty repos,139 some lenders
131. Zubrow, supra note 109, at 7.
132. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1535 (noting Lehman filed for bankruptcy on Monday,
September 15).
133. See FCIC Hearing, supra note 107, at 188 (statement of Barry Zubrow). The JPM Chief Risk
Officer testified:
[G]oing into that weekend, the triparty book of financing was obviously held by [lenders], and the
question would then come up on Monday morning, the 15th, as to whether or not we would be able
to do an unwind and provide intraday financing. And certainly over the weekend . . . we were very
concerned that there would not be sufficient [lender] counterparties to continue to finance on the
night of the 15th without a strategic resolution of the entire Lehman situation. . . . It certainly
appeared to us at that point that there was not going to be [lender] appetite to continue to finance
Lehman’s operations.
Id.
134. COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 19.
135. Id. at 39 fig.6.
136. COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 56.
137. See id. at 56 (quoting Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1536 n.5994).
138. See id. (stating “it is possible some of the investors that remained with Lehman were stuck in term
trades and unable to pull back their funds without breaking legal contracts”).
139. Fed staff later offered this analysis:
We can think of five reasons for the decrease in collateral posted by Lehman Brothers in the
tri-party repo market. First, [lenders] . . . may have pulled back . . . to protect themselves against the
increased risk of a Lehman Brothers’ default. . . . Second, Lehman Brothers was forced to post
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almost certainly stopped loaning “to protect themselves against the increased risk of a
Lehman Brothers’ default.”140 JPM’s Chief Risk Officer said later that, by September
12, “some of the largest [lenders] pulled back entirely, refusing to provide Lehman
with the overnight financing it desperately needed to keep operating.”141 Repos with
Fidelity, for example, dropped from $12 billion on September 5 to $2 billion on
September 12,142 and, at the end, Fidelity was pulling back the rest of its overnight
triparties from Lehman.143 Lenders may have refused to loan even against high-quality
collateral.144 Indeed, the triparty repos based on the highest-quality securities—U.S.
Treasuries and Agency debentures—declined so precipitously145 that the percentage of
total repos supported by the high-quality securities drastically declined.146
Importantly, the lenders did not slowly adjust deal terms as Lehman’s fortunes
faded. Haircuts, by category of collateral, hardly changed at all.147 Nor did the interest
rates that Lehman paid change when adjusted for type of collateral.148
additional collateral with counterparties for other types of transactions over this time, which may
have reduced its tri-party repo portfolio. Third, in reaction to rumors of Lehman Brothers’ upcoming
demise, hedge funds and other Lehman clients were moving their business to other dealers and thus
withdrawing their collateral from Lehman Brothers. . . . Fourth, the wind-down or deleveraging of
the short-dated (primarily overnight) matched books in Treasuries, agency debt, and agency MBS
likely played a part . . . . Fifth, and finally, in facing a run by investors, Lehman Brothers may have
been selling collateral to raise money.
COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 19.
140. Id.
141. Zubrow, supra note 109, at 8.
142. FCIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 331.
143. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1161 n.4298.
144. See COHAN, supra note 10, at 513 (“Lehman’s counterparties and overnight repo financing sources
‘started to go wiggy on us,’ a Lehman executive said, ‘and once people won’t take your good collateral it was
only a matter of days before we were in Bear mode.’”).
145. COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 57 fig.20 (showing triparty repo collateral
posted by Lehman over time, divided by category of securities used, revealing—between September 8 and
14—a collapse in repos based on U.S. Treasuries and Agency debentures).
146. Id. at 58 (“Alongside the decrease in collateral posted by Lehman Brothers, there was a shift in the
composition of the . . . securities Lehman Brothers financed from high to low-quality collateral. From July 1,
2008 to September 1, 2008, 70% of Lehman’s tri-party book was financing Treasury, Agency Debentures and
Agency MBS collateral. In the week prior to filing for bankruptcy, these collateral types made up 63% of
Lehman’s book and only 11% for the week of September 15. Coincidentally, the share of non Fed-eligible
collateral increased dramatically, rising to 87% from about a quarter of Lehman’s tri-party collateral.”). This
may have resulted from Lehman responding to lender flight by selling high-quality securities into markets
sufficiently deep to avoid fire-sale prices and keeping the lower-quality securities that could not be so sold.
147. See id. at 59 (“With Lehman Brothers facing a run by investors, we expect this firm to face higher
haircuts in the tri-party repo market. Haircuts, after all, protect investors from losses in the case of a dealer
default. Surprisingly, alongside the dramatic decrease in collateral posted, Lehman Brothers did not face
higher haircuts until just before it declared bankruptcy. . . . [T]he median haircut Lehman Brothers faced in the
two weeks before declaring bankruptcy was essentially flat until Thursday, September 11, two business days
before declaring bankruptcy.”); see also COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 18 (“Even the
small increases in the margin spread in the last days before Lehman’s bankruptcy are mostly explained by a
change in Lehman’s tri-party repo book toward lower-quality collateral.”).
148. See COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 59–60 (data provided by a large lender
showed that, from September 1 to 12, 2008, the “average interest rate . . . slightly increase[d] from 2.313 to 2.5
on September 12, based on cash loaned against Corporate and Money Market collateral. The rate increase
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The lenders thereby treated the repos like unsecured debt—to be discontinued as
soon as possible when some combination of news suggested that the borrower might
default—instead of secured debt, which would (after tightening terms) provide
adequate protection for the lender through the ability to sell collateral.149 Put another
way, and borrowing with modification a phrase coined by Professor Gorton at Yale, the
lenders who suddenly pulled away in Lehman’s last days were information insensitive
until shock.150 That is, the lenders continued to lend—without adjusting terms in
response to new information—through the decline in Lehman’s fortunes during the first
and second quarters.151 However, the combination of bad news in mid-September 2008
(Lehman’s third-quarter loss, adverse credit rating actions, and the end of negotiations
with Korean investors)152 shocked them into complete withdrawal of their loans to
Lehman. In effect, even though they were sophisticated participants in the U.S.
financial system,153 the lenders acted like retail depositors during a bank run.154
Lenders may have reacted this way in part because many of them did not have a
plan in place to sell any significant amount of collateral in the event that a dealer
defaulted on its repurchase obligations.155 Abandoning repos with Lehman—rather
[was] small [and] only cost Lehman Brothers about $13,000.”).
149. An industry study commented after the fact:
In the context of the tri-party repo market, the ‘lesson learned’ that stands out the most is the
over-reliance on short-term secured funding and its presumed stability. Discussions in the Task
Force emphasized repeatedly that many [lenders] focus primarily if not almost exclusively on
counterparty concerns and that they will withdraw secured funding on the same or very similar
timeframes as they would withdraw unsecured funding.
2010 PAYMENTS RISK COMM., supra note 54, at 19; see also COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41,
at 22–23 (“Taken to the extreme, the risk management strategy of these [lenders] treats tri-party repo
transactions as unsecured loans.”).
150. Professor Gorton concentrates on the bilateral repo market and refers to the collateral there
changing over time from “informationally insensitive” to “informationally sensitive,” with the result that—in
the bilateral market—haircuts did significantly increase, which effectively constituted a “run on repo” that
sapped dealer liquidity. See GARY GORTON, SLAPPED IN THE FACE BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: BANKING AND THE
PANIC OF 2007, at 23 (2010) (defining information-insensitive debt); id. at 32, 51 (arguing that a bank panic
occurs when bank debt becomes information sensitive); id. at 45 (stating that repo lending was designed to rest
on information-insensitive collateral); id. at 47–52 (concluding that a run on repo occurred when uncertainty
about collateral developed and haircuts went from virtually nothing to significant percentages, with the effects
of those haircuts mimicking bank withdrawals); see also COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at
1–3 (contrasting bilateral market studied by Gorton with the triparty market).
151. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lehman’s earnings reports in the
first and second quarters of its 2008 fiscal year and supra note 147 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the lenders’ unadjusted terms.
152. See supra notes 24, 26–27 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lehman’s third-quarter 2008
losses, the downgrade of Lehman’s credit rating, and the failure of Korean investments at this time.
153. Money market funds loaned “between a quarter and a third” of the total dollar credit extended
through the triparty repo market, and “securities lenders [loaned about] another quarter.” COPELAND, REPO
RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 7.
154. See id. at 25 (“[T]he tri-party repo market exhibited precipitous reductions in the tri-party repo
funding of specific institutions, something more similar to traditional bank runs. . . . [Lenders] did not appear
to adjust, in a gradual way, either the margin or the quantity of cash supplied to the market.”).
155. An industry study group later found that “[i]n many cases, [lenders] were unprepared to cope with
the consequences of a Dealer default, in particular the potential need to manage and liquidate collateral
securing a defaulted repo position.” 2010 PAYMENTS RISK COMM., supra note 54, at 4.
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than, for example, increasing haircuts in order to ensure that a sale of collateral would
cover the amount loaned—made sense for those lenders, as they had no strategy for
selling the collateral anyway. Moreover, money market funds supplied a very
considerable percentage of the money lent in triparty repos.156 The money funds may
have feared that, if word got out that they were loaning even overnight to a dealer in
trouble, they themselves might suffer a run.157 The funds may have employed a
heuristic gut check: when the money funds viscerally concluded that their investors
might run if those investors knew the funds were loaning to Lehman, the funds became
simply unwilling to lend to Lehman at all.
Whatever the reason for lender flight, the lenders’ refusal to lend ate into
Lehman’s liquidity. Each refusal to renew a repo on a security created an immediate
cash problem, as Lehman had to pay off the portion of the intraday debt to JPM
representing JPM’s advance to pay off the overnight lender who last provided the
sundown-to-sunup financing for the security.
To raise the cash to pay the intraday loan, Lehman could choose one of four
strategies. First, Lehman could sell the security for which it could no longer find repo
financing (call it Asset A). If that sale reaped the full amount of the intraday loan
associated with Asset A (as would be the case with a high-quality, extremely liquid
security), then Lehman could pay off that portion of the loan and, after doing so, would
have the same cash available for operations going forward. Lehman would, however,
be smaller. It would have lost whatever business advantages holding Asset A provided
(e.g., as inventory for sales or as a proprietary investment that might increase in value
over time and eventually be sold for a profit). Moreover, if the emergency sale reaped
an amount less than the associated intraday loan (as might be true if Asset A was a
lower-quality security sold into a thin and falling market), then Lehman, in order to pay
off the associated intraday loan, would have to reach into its own cash reserves to pay
the difference. Dollar for dollar, using its own cash to make up that difference would
reduce Lehman’s liquidity.
Second, Lehman could pay off the intraday loan associated with Asset A by
repoing a previously unencumbered security (call it Asset B). This strategy, however,
might have been practically unavailable when lenders were pulling back without regard
to collateral but simply because of Lehman’s perceived default risk. Moreover, to the
extent that Lehman could implement this strategy only by encumbering a higherquality Asset B in order to obtain debt financing for lower-quality Asset A that triparty
lenders would no longer accept, that lower-quality asset became dead weight for
liquidity purposes. And, of course, the higher-quality asset would now be encumbered
and therefore no longer available to raise additional cash in the future.
156. See supra note 153 for a discussion of the percentage money market funds and securities lenders
loaned through the triparty market.
157. See COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 38 (“[M]oney market mutual funds . . . have
to worry that they may face withdrawal pressures from their own investors. . . . Upon learning that a money
fund in which they have invested is financing a dealer perceived to be having creditworthiness issues or was
financing a dealer now in default, these investors may preemptively withdraw their funds, regardless of the
risk that liquidating the collateral actually represents. This ‘headline’ risk, the risk that a money fund may find
itself in the headline of a news story, is another reason why money funds may prefer not to finance a dealer,
even against high quality collateral.”).
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Third, Lehman could sell Asset B and use the proceeds to pay off the intraday
loan associated with Asset A. But this alternative would leave Lehman with Asset A,
which it could no longer repo finance. Even if JPM would provide an intraday loan
against that collateral, Lehman could not pay off that loan at sundown because it could
not find an overnight loan to finance that payment. And, as with the second strategy,
Lehman would be left with an asset that was dead weight for liquidity purposes, at the
cost of using up the liquidity potential of a higher-quality security.
Fourth, Lehman could simply reach into its cash reserves and use part of that cash
to pay all of the intraday loan associated with Asset A. But this alternative, quite
obviously, would dollar for dollar reduce Lehman’s cash for operations in the future.
None of these alternatives appealed to a financial firm facing an ongoing liquidity
crisis in which more and more triparty lenders refused to lend. Each of these
alternatives sapped liquidity, except the single case in which Lehman could
immediately sell a security that had been repoed, but could not now be repoed, for an
amount at least equal to the amount of the related intraday loan. It is virtually
impossible to conclude that Lehman was able to implement this alternative to address
the entire $55 billion drop in repo financing between September 8 and September 12,
2008.158 Instead, as the bankruptcy examiner concluded, Lehman was “unable to fund
itself and continue to operate” without repo funding.159
Just as lender flight reduced Lehman’s ability to finance the securities it owned,
so too did the flight most likely savage the firm’s matched book business.160 At the end
of May 2008, somewhere between one-third and one-half of Lehman’s triparty repos
were the triparty legs of matched transactions and customer funding.161 And the pure
leverage matched transactions accounted for about one-half of Lehman’s total
leverage.162 Although no separate figures for the matched book during Lehman’s last
days are available, there is no reason to believe that lenders who loaned in the triparty
portion of a match were any less information insensitive until shock than lenders who
loaned to finance Lehman’s inventory or proprietary investments. Nor is there any
reason to believe that information-insensitive-until-shock lenders were any more
willing to finance matching transactions than other deals.163 Instead, the very large
158. See supra note 136 and accompanying text for a discussion of the details of the severe decline in
Lehman’s triparty repo financing from September 8, 2008, to September 12.
159. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 3.
160. See COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 19 (stating that the “wind-down” of
matched books “likely played a part in the decline of tri-party funding in the last few days before the
bankruptcy”).
161. See Lehman 2Q 10-Q, supra note 23, at 84 (reporting that total triparty repos were $188 billion);
Lehman Second Quarter Conference Call, supra note 23, at 14 (Ian Lowitt, CFO) (stating that one-third to
one-half of $188 billion in repos consisted of matched deals and customer funding).
162. See FCIC Hearing, supra note 107, at 154–55 (statement of Richard S. Fuld, Jr.).
163. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1161 n.4298 (quoting a September 11, 2008, JPM email that
states “much of [the] decline” in Lehman’s triparty repo financing “up to last week has been self imposed.”);
COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 19 (speculating that Lehman itself might have initiated a
reduction in its matched book as part of an effort to reduce leverage).
But the circularity of the matched transactions obscures causation. For example, a hedge fund using a
bilateral repo with Lehman to feed financing to it from a matching triparty transaction might be loath to
continue that arrangement if the hedge fund thought there was a real risk Lehman might go under. And the
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percentage of matched deals in Lehman’s triparty borrowing and the very large decline
in triparty borrowing strongly suggest that the collapse of the triparty lending affected
Lehman’s matched book business in a very significant way.
Before leaving lender flight, note one last oddity. The government had reacted to
Bear’s crisis not only by engineering Bear’s merger into JPM but also by creating the
Prime Dealer Credit Facility (the PDCF).164 The PDCF provided overnight financing
that replicated triparty repos,165 and PDCF financing ran through the clearing banks,
using the triparty infrastructure.166 Dealers could obtain PDCF financing only by
posting high-quality securities as collateral.167 The PDCF was therefore intended to
address directly a crisis in which triparty lenders suddenly withdrew overnight lending
against very high-quality securities. For reasons set out below, Lehman did not resort to
this public lender of last resort even once as the firm’s liquidity disappeared.168 And so,
forgoing this government backstop, Lehman experienced the full shock of private
lender flight, which left it clutching its chest and thrashing on the floor in its last week
before bankruptcy.
In sum, lenders who were information insensitive until shock suddenly refused to
lend to Lehman during the week of September 8 through 12, creating in each case an
hedge fund might fear a Lehman default because it got wind of lender flight from Lehman on other deals.
Similarly, Lehman might not solicit the hedge fund for a matched deal if—as a result of lender
flight—Lehman was uncertain that it could match the hedge fund→Lehman bilateral repo with a
Lehman→lender triparty repo. In both cases, the animating cause of the reduced matched book business works
back to the lender flight.
As for the JPM email, it refers to the decline up to, at the latest, September 5, and the passage quoted
above says nothing about the decline in the week of September 8–12, when repos dropped by a frightening
thirty-seven percent. See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text.
164. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Financial Markets—Promotion of
Orderly Market Functioning Through an Extension of Credit to The Bear Stearns Companies Inc.,
Establishment of a Credit Facility for Primary Securities Dealers, and Other Actions (Mar. 16, 2008) (on file
with author).
165. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1389 (“Under the PDCF, the [Fed] would make
collateralized loans to broker-dealers . . . and in effect, act as a repo counterparty.”); FCIC REPORT, supra note
10, at 294 (describing the PDCF “as an alternative to the overnight tri-party repo lenders”); Primary Dealer
RES.
BANK
N.Y.,
Credit
Facility:
Program
Terms
and
Conditions,
FED.
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pdcf_terms_080316.html (last visited May 21, 2014) [hereinafter Initial
PDCF Terms] (offering overnight lending).
166. See Tobias Adrian et al., The Federal Reserve’s Primary Dealer Credit Facility, 15 CURRENT
ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN. 1, 5 (2009) (“The PDCF program is based on the triparty repo legal and operational
infrastructure . . . .”); Initial PDCF Terms, supra note 165 (“Dealers will communicate their demand for
funding to their clearing banks. The clearing bank will verify that a sufficient amount of eligible collateral has
been pledged by each primary dealer participating in the PDCF and notify the New York Fed accordingly.
Once the New York Fed receives notice that a sufficient amount of margin-adjusted eligible collateral has been
assigned to the New York Fed’s account, the New York Fed will transfer the amount of the loan to the clearing
bank for credit to the primary dealer.”).
167. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., DOMESTIC OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS DURING 2008, at 10
(2009), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/omo2008.pdf (describing OMO collateral as
“U.S. Treasury securities,” “direct federal Agency obligations,” and “Agency MBS”); Initial PDCF Terms,
supra note 165 (“Collateral eligible for pledge under the PDCF includes all collateral eligible for pledge in
open market operations [‘OMO’], plus investment grade corporate securities, municipal securities, mortgagebacked securities and asset-backed securities.”).
168. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1399.

PREDICTING A HEART ATTACK

2014]

489

immediate liquidity problem that Lehman could only solve by taking steps that reduced
its liquidity going forward. Other factors contributed to the liquidity decline.169 But the
triparty problems—collateral demands from JPM, lender desertion, and the related
matched book drop—played a key role. Squeezed by the two other sides of the triparty
triangle, Lehman’s liquidity “evaporated” in its last week of existence.170
c.

Dynamics of Triparty Repos That Accelerated Lehman’s Liquidity Decline

In part in response to Lehman’s collapse, the Fed and industry participants studied
the triparty repo market and concluded that—as structured in 2008—that market could
generate a vicious, self-magnifying dynamic. Thus, as some lenders began to flee a
dealer, others became less likely to lend for fear that an insufficient number of lenders
would remain so that the dealer would live long enough to make good on even shortterm loans.171 As a clearing bank considered whether to exercise its discretion to
unwind after lender flight began, its inclination to do so might decline as it came to fear
that the dealer would be unable to find sufficient overnight financing to repay the
intraday loan that the unwind created.172 And as the lenders became concerned that the
clearing bank might not unwind, they became less likely to lend.173 The different
participants in the triparty repo structure could thereby have encouraged each other—
once a run began—to continue the run until the dealer died.174 Research has not
revealed the extent to which these dynamics affected Lehman’s decline, but the speed
of that decline strongly suggests that such self-accelerating dynamics played an
aggravating role.

169. Besides JPM, other banks (not clearing repos but clearing other types transactions)—such as
Citibank, HSBC, Bank of New York Mellon, and Standard Bank—demanded collateral from Lehman.
Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1223–42, 1279–81, 1284–85, 1303–08, 1376–78, 1382–85.
170. FCIC Hearing, supra note 107, at 155–56 (statement of Lehman CEO Richard Fuld) (“We had a
strong liquidity pool, which unfortunately evaporated in three days after the run on the bank ensued.”); id. at
160 (“We went into that last week with over $40 billion of liquidity. We lost close to 30 of it in three days. . . .
We needed the liquidity.”).
171. Because a lender is better off not investing if it believes that other lenders will not invest, “it is an
equilibrium for all [lenders] not to [lend].” COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 42; see also
COPELAND, POLICY ISSUES, supra note 76, at 19 (“Each [lender], once concerned that others may run, has a
clear incentive to run.”).
172. See Antoine Martin et al., 27 REV. FIN STUDIES 957, 985 (2014) (modeling, under the heading
“Fragility: Coordination problem between the clearing bank and investors,” the dynamic that could cause
either the clearing bank to refuse to unwind in light of fears that lenders would refuse to renew repos to a
dealer, or lenders to refuse to renew repos in light of fears that the clearing bank would refuse to unwind).
173. See COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 42–43 (“Assume that [lenders] become
concerned that the clearing banks may refuse to unwind the repos of a dealer. The clearing bank may take this
action because it does not want to be exposed to the dealer’s failure if it occurs during the day. The [lenders]
realize that the dealer would almost certainly have to default if the clearing bank does not unwind its repos.
Hence, the [lenders] will be reluctant to provide repo financing to the dealer.”).
174. See id. at 43 (“This dynamic is self-fulfilling in the sense that the reluctance of the clearing bank to
unwind the repos of a given dealer creates the condition for [lenders] not to want to provide repo funding to
that dealer, which justifies the clearing bank’s concerns. Similarly, the reluctance of [lenders] to extend
financing to a dealer creates the condition for the clearing bank to prefer not to unwind the dealer’s repos,
which justifies the [lenders’] concerns.”).
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Endgame

Just because the actions of JPM and lenders moved Lehman toward a cardiac
arrest did not mean that the firm was doomed. When a large financial institution faced
failure, it might merge into a healthier one, and the government might help.175 The
government midwifed multiple mergers for exactly this purpose during the credit
crisis.176 In September 2008, Lehman’s turn arrived.
1.

How the Endgame Matters to Shareholders

Endgame maneuvers are critical to the shareholders of a failing financial firm.
JPM’s acquisition of Bear provides an excellent example.177 So does Lehman’s
bankruptcy.
As discussed above, the Bear endgame succeeded, with the Bear-JPM merger
yielding ten dollars per share for Bear stockholders.178 The Lehman endgame failed,
producing only bankruptcy and about twenty cents per share for Lehman stockholders
who acted quickly, and less than a dime for those who tarried.179 This Article therefore
turns now to the details of Lehman’s fight for survival and, in particular, the failure of
the firm and the government to find a buyer for Lehman in the last days of Lehman’s
life.
2.

Lehman’s Endgame Failure

Lehman went down fighting. Liquidity is cash, and Lehman brought cash in,
through more than $17 billion of securities offerings in 2008.180 It at least planned to
reduce cash going out by cutting its dividend at the very end.181 The firm also reduced
175. Viral V. Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, Cash in-the-Market Pricing and Optimal Resolution of
Bank Failures, in LIQUIDITY AND CRISES 512, 533 (Franklin Allen et al., eds. 2011).
176. See KOLB, supra note 7, at 184 (“[E]mergency actions led to the merger of Countrywide Financial
and Merrill Lynch into Bank of America, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual into JPMorgan Chase, and
Wachovia into Wells Fargo. All of these mergers were accomplished with the active intervention and
assistance of the federal government, and all of them were financially assisted by the federal government, with
the exception of Wells Fargo’s acquisition of Wachovia, which was supported by tax concessions but no actual
transfer of immediate cash.”); id. at 185 tbl.10.1 (reporting the assets of specific banks before and after the
financial crisis).
177. See supra notes 10–20 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bear’s survival through a
government-assisted merger.
178. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
180. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 639–40 (reporting $4 billion convertible preferred stock in April,
$1 billion senior notes in April, $2 billion subordinated notes in May, $2.5 billion senior notes in May, and $6
billion common and preferred stock in June); Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), Ex. 3.1
(Certificate of Designations, Powers, Preferences, and Rights) (Feb. 12, 2008) (documenting an offering of
$1.9 billion of preferred stock in February).
181. Preliminary Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. Earnings Conference Call 3–4 (Richard Fuld, CEO) (Sept.
10, 2008) (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter Lehman Third Quarter Conference Call]; Lehman Press
Release Sept. 10, 2008, supra note 24, at 5. The Seeking Alpha transcript for the September call puts the date
at September 11, but the call occurred on September 10. Heidi N. Moore, Live-Blogging the Lehman
Conference Call, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 10, 2008, 8:10 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2008/09/10/live-bloggingthe-lehman-conference-call/.
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leverage during 2008,182 which technically meant reducing the ratio of assets to equity
and, in plainer words, meant that the firm was funding fewer of its assets with
borrowed money and more with money that shareholders put in—generally considered
a way of reducing risk.183
Lehman took other steps to bolster confidence among those on whom it depended
for liquidity support. In January 2008, it distanced itself from the residential mortgage
business, around which the credit crisis seemed to revolve, by suspending activities at a
subsidiary specializing in those mortgages.184 Throughout the year, Lehman reduced its
residential mortgage-related holdings, particularly those resting on subprime
mortgages.185 In June, Lehman changed both its chief financial officer and its
president/chief operating officer to show its commitment to reverse its declining
fortunes.186
Lehman also repeatedly discussed private deals that would inject capital into the
firm and rid it of problematic assets. Some of these transactions would have radically
transformed the company by giving new investors a controlling interest or spinning off
assets or business operations. While none of these efforts bore fruit, they included
discussions with Warren Buffet, a consortium of Korean financial institutions including
the state-owned Korean Development Bank (KDB), KDB by itself, MetLife, the
182. Lehman reported both a leverage ratio and a “net leverage” ratio. See Lehman 2007 10-K, supra
note 4, at 29–30 (displaying Lehman’s financial data and showing how Lehman calculated its net assets and
leverage ratios). Table 1 below shows the figures:
Table 1
11/30/07

2/29/08

5/31/08

8/31/08
Press release included
in Lehman 8-K filed
9/10/08 at 19

Lehman 2007
10-K at 29

Lehman Q1 2008
10-Q at 72

Lehman Q2 2008
10-Q at 88

Leverage

30.7x

31.7x

24.3x

21.1x

Net
Leverage

16.1x

15.4x

12.1x

10.6x

Lehman’s reported leverage ratios may have misled due to Repo 105 and Repo 108 transactions. See
Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 727–1053 (devoting an entire volume to Repo 105 and Repo 108). But even
after backing out those deals, Lehman’s net leverage was in fact declining. See id. at 748 (showing net
leverage without Repo 105 and 108 at end of Q4 2007 (17.8), Q1 2008 (17.3), and Q2 2008 (13.9)).
183. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 80, at 8–11 (showing that increasing leverage increases risk).
184. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 17, 2008).
185. Here are the figures that Lehman reported for total holdings of subprime U.S. residential mortgages
and securities backed by subprime mortgages:
Table 2
11/30/07

Holdings

2/29/08

5/31/08

8/31/08

2007
10-K at 105

2008 Q1
10-Q at 20

2008 Q2
10-Q at 25

(Press release)
Attachment III
(Ex. 99.2) Lehman
Form 8-K (9/10/08)

$5.276 billion

$4.017 billion

$2.755 billion

$1.6 billion

186. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 615 (stating that Lehman’s CEO “told the Board that he
intended the management change to be a ‘dramatic’ demonstration to Wall Street that Lehman was taking
action to make changes”).
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Investment Corporation of Dubai, and Bank of America (BofA).187
All of these steps fell generally within the rubric of Lehman’s “survival
strategy.”188 But Lehman’s true endgame—desperate efforts, assisted by the
government, to sell the company—began on Tuesday, September 9, 2008, when
Secretary Paulson called BofA’s CEO to urge expressly that BofA buy Lehman in
whole.189 After BofA conducted due diligence for such a purchase, it concluded that
Lehman was overvaluing its commercial real estate assets and that some $60–$67
billion of Lehman assets were undesirable at any price.190 BofA was accordingly
unwilling to proceed unless the U.S. government provided financial assistance for the
deal,191 which the government said it would not do.192
The government’s determination not to put its own money into a mid-September
Lehman rescue likely derived from very particular facts. The political backlash from
the government participation in JPM’s acquisition of Bear in March was fresh in
policymakers’ minds.193 Even more temporally proximate, the government placed the
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) into conservatorship on September 7,194 a move
that prompted additional criticism.195 And during the weekend coda to the government
efforts to save Lehman, Secretary Paulson heard ominous tidings of bad news at
American International Group (AIG),196 which would lead shortly to an $85 billion
bailout.197 The particular week in which Lehman’s endgame played out—September 9
through September 15—was therefore a terrible one during which to seek government
money to help save a failing financial institution.
Instead of putting in government money to facilitate a merger to save Lehman’s
life, Secretary Paulson envisioned a private sector solution and convened a meeting of
187. Id. at 651–52, 665–81, 687–96.
188. That is how the Lehman Examiner categorized these efforts. Id. at 609–726.
189. PAULSON, supra note 14, at 175–77.
190. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 699.
191. Id. at 699, 701.
192. PAULSON, supra note 14, at 184–85, 189.
193. As one Wall Street lawyer told the Financial Crisis Commission later, “It was said on more than
one occasion that it would be very politically difficult to rescue Lehman. There had been a lot of blowback
after Bear Stearns.” FCIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 334; see also id. at 330 (stating that on September 9,
“Treasury Chief of Staff Jim Wilkinson emailed Michelle Davis, the assistant secretary for public affairs at
Treasury, to express his distaste for government assistance: ‘We need to talk. . . . I just can’t stomach us
bailing out lehman. . . . Will be horrible in the press don’t u think.’”); PAULSON, supra note 14, at 117 (“[T]he
[Bear] deal was hugely controversial . . . . Senator Richard Shelby. . . said the action set a ‘bad precedent.’”).
194. Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Statement of FHFA Director James B. Lockhart 5 (Sept. 7,
2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/fhfa_statement_090708hp
1128.pdf.
195. PAULSON, supra note 14, at 181 (“All of us were well aware that after Fannie and Freddie, the
country, Congress, and both parties were fed up with bailouts. . . . And just before our conference call
[between Paulson, Geithner, and Treasury staffers, to discuss Lehman] had begun I’d spoken with [Senator]
Chris Dodd, who told me, ‘Fuld [Lehman’s CEO] is a friend. Try to help, but don’t bail Lehman out.’”).
196. Id. at 200. Christopher Flowers told Paulson on Saturday, September 13, that AIG would run out of
money in ten days. Id.; see also id. at 205 (“We had gone into the weekend to save Lehman Brothers, and now
AIG was facing a liquidity crisis that had put it on the verge of bankruptcy . . . .”).
197. Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 26, 2008).
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Wall Street CEOs to put together a plan.198 By the time that group began meeting in the
early evening of Friday, September 12,199 Barclays, a large British financial institution,
had emerged as a second possible Lehman purchaser—an alternative to BofA.200
Barclays’ interest, however, was in a Lehman without certain commercial real estate
assets and private equity investments.201
After BofA lost interest on Saturday, September 13,202 the Wall Street titans (who
continued to meet through the weekend)203 focused on financing problematic assets that
Barclays did not want.204 The collected CEOs concluded that Lehman—even after a
recent write-down—valued those assets at far more than their worth.205 If such assets
were to be bought from Lehman before Barclays bought Lehman, the new owner
(financed by the Wall Street firms the CEOs represented) would have to take any
subsequent loss.206 The Wall Street firms agreed to finance that loss and, by Sunday,
September 14, had prepared a term sheet by which they would commit more than $30
billion to a purchase of Lehman property that Barclays would not take.207
Barclays appeared ready to proceed as well, subject to the approval of its
regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in London.208 But the transaction
required that Barclays guarantee Lehman’s obligations between the time the deal was
struck and the time it closed.209 That guarantee, in turn, required an affirmative vote by
Barclays’ shareholders, which obviously could not be obtained over the September 13–
14 weekend because the necessary procedures to receive an affirmative vote by
Barclays’ shareholders would have taken thirty to sixty days.210 The FSA had the
power to waive the requirement for the Barclays’ shareholder vote,211 but it refused to
do so, despite personal appeals from the President of the New York Fed, the Chairman
198. FCIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 334.
199. PAULSON, supra note 14, at 191.
200. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 703.
201. Id. at 706–07.
202. PAULSON, supra note 14, at 201.
203. See id. at 206 (reporting the CEOs’ position on Saturday evening); id. at 213 (providing Paulson’s
report to the CEOs on early Sunday afternoon).
204. COHAN, supra note 10, at 515.
205. Id. at 517.
206. Id.
207. See PAULSON, supra note 14, at 206, 210 (describing the terms of the proposed deal and stating that
“[i]f Barclays had committed to the deal, we would have had industry financing in place”).
208. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 707–08.
209. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 335 (“[T]he New York Fed required Barclays to guarantee
Lehman’s obligations from the sale until the transaction closed . . . .”).
210. See id. (explaining that a vote could take thirty to sixty days). This agreement was considered a
class 1 transaction because it included an unlimited and exceptional guarantee. See FINANCIAL CONDUCT
AUTHORITY, LISTING RULE § 10.2.4(1)(c)
(as
of
Sept.
14,
2008),
available
at
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/. To accomplish a class 1 transaction, the listed company had to
send an explanatory circular to its shareholders and obtain their prior approval in a general meeting. See id.
§ 10.5.1(2).
211. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 708 (reporting the FSA “acknowledged that theoretically it
could waive the shareholder approval requirement”); FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, LISTING RULE
§ 1.2.1(1) (“The FCA may dispense with or modify the listing rules in such cases and by reference to such
circumstances as it considers appropriate . . . .”).
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of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Secretary of the
Treasury.212 The Barclays’ deal was Lehman’s last hope, and when it died, the U.S.
government suggested that Lehman file for bankruptcy, which Lehman did.213 So,
oddly enough, it was a foreign regulator that turned Lehman’s liquidity heart attack into
a no-code death.
II.

WHY NOBODY KNEW WHAT WAS COMING

With the Lehman story set out, this Article now turns to the firm’s multiple
disclosures. From the beginning of 2008 until it filed for bankruptcy on September 15,
Lehman filed the following documents, among others, with the SEC: a Form 10-K for
its 2007 fiscal year, a Form 10-Q for its first 2008 quarter, a Form 10-Q for its second
quarter, and a proxy statement for its annual meeting.214 Lehman also issued press
releases with financial results for the first, second, and third quarters of its 2008 fiscal
year215 and hosted conference calls in which its top executives answered questions
from securities analysts about the company’s performance in those three quarters and
its plans for the future.216 The analysis turns now to whether—when it made sense for
stockholders to consider the question and when they were still able to sell their Lehman
stock and recoup some significant portion of their purchase price—these disclosures
permitted shareholders to predict, at the time the disclosures were made, a substantial
chance of liquidity death before the year was out.
To address these questions, Part A selects two time periods in which to analyze
Lehman’s disclosures: (1) the month of January 2008 and (2) March 10 to June 20,
2008. Parts B and C proceed to test whether—taken as a whole and looking at their
effect rather than their content—Lehman’s disclosures during these two periods alerted
shareholders to looming liquidity failure. The last two Parts then turn to disclosure
content and ask whether Lehman’s disclosures—in each of the two periods—warned
shareholders of the risks posed by triparty repos (Part D) and a possible endgame (Part
E).
A.

The Two Periods in Which To Test Lehman’s Disclosures

In the discussion below, this Article examines disclosures in two key time
periods. The first is January 2008. January 2008 makes sense as the first test period

212. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 708–09 (noting that Geithner and SEC Chairman Cox each
called the FSA chair); FCIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 336 (showing that Paulson called the U.K. chancellor
of the exchequer).
213. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 723–26.
214. Lehman 2Q 10-Q, supra note 23; Lehman 1Q 10-Q, supra note 21; Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.,
Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14-A) (Mar. 5, 2008); Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4.
215. See Lehman Press Release Mar. 18, 2008, supra note 21; Lehman Press Release June 9, 2008,
supra note 23 (expected figures); Lehman Press Release June 16, 2008, supra note 23 (final figures); Lehman
Press Release Sept. 10, 2008, supra note 24.
216. Lehman Third Quarter Conference Call, supra note 181; Lehman Second Quarter Conference Call,
supra note 23; Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Conference Call: Preliminary Second Quarter Earnings Figures
(June 10, 2008) (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter June 10 Preliminary Q2 Figures Call]; Lehman
First Quarter Conference Call, supra note 21.
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because Lehman was coming off a good fiscal 2007.217 The mortgage crisis, however,
was well underway.218 It would therefore have made sense for a shareholder to ask—
when Lehman was still doing well but after the crisis had begun—whether there was a
real chance that the problems reverberating through the financial world threatened
Lehman with a catastrophic liquidity event. Moreover, since Lehman’s stock price
during January 2008 varied between $53.25 per share and $64.05 per share and closed
at $64.05 per share, a shareholder would still have recovered over half the stock’s
purchase price by selling in January 2008, even if the shareholder had bought at the
$85.80 per share price on February 2, 2007, which was the highest price for which
Lehman stock sold in 2007 and 2008.219
The second test period begins on March 10, 2008, the first day of the week in
which Bear nearly died.220 If ever there was a time to consider whether Lehman risked
liquidity failure, that time arrived when a sister institution suffered such a fate. The full
evaluation of Lehman’s vulnerability in light of Bear’s experience arguably continued
through Lehman’s announcement of its final second-quarter financial results on June
16, Lehman’s second-quarter conference call with analysts on June 16,221 and a few
days thereafter during which market participants could mull over this news. A warning
to Lehman stockholders even as late as June 20 would have been timely since, even on

217. See supra note 8 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lehman’s success in the 2007 fiscal
year.
218. In June 2007, two hedge funds sponsored by Bear Stearns nearly imploded. Both had invested in
complex securities backed by subprime mortgages. Bear committed to loan as much as $3.2 billion to save one
of them. Kate Kelly & Serena Ng, Lifeline: Bear Stearns Bails Out Fund with Big Loan; Injection of $3.2
Billion Caps Days of Drama; Subprime Sector Fears, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2007, at A1; Kate Kelly et al.,
Two Big Funds at Bear Stearns Face Shutdown; As Rescue Plan Falters Amid Subprime Woes, Merrill Asserts
Claims, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2007, at A1. By August, those funds had attempted to file for bankruptcy, and
Bear Stearns’ president/co–chief operating officer had resigned. Bear Stearns Co., Current Report (Form 8-K)
(filed Aug. 9, 2007); Landon Thomas, Jr., A Top Official at Bear Stearns Ousted over Funds Implosion, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, at C1; Judge Rejects Bankruptcy for 2 Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2007, at C4.
In December, Bear announced that it lost money in the last quarter of its 2007 fiscal year, in part due to $1.9
billion in write-downs of mortgage-related assets. Bear Stearns Co., Current Report (Form 8-K), Ex. 99.2
(Press Release) (Dec. 21, 2007). Bear’s CEO retired in early January 2008, reportedly in part as a result of the
company’s poor financial performance during the mortgage crisis. Kate Kelly, Cayne To Step Down as Bear
Stearns CEO, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2008, at A1.
Other companies had also suffered reverses. Countrywide, the largest mortgage lender in the United
States, reported its first loss in twenty-five years in October 2007 while writing down $690 million on home
equity lines and subprime loans. Gretchen Morgenson, Countrywide Is Upbeat Despite Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
27, 2007, at C1, C9. Morgan Stanley reported its first quarterly loss in seventy-two years in December 2007,
occasioned in part by a $9.4 billion write-down of mortgage-related assets. Landon Thomas, Jr., Wall St. Firm
Reports Loss, Its First Ever, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2007, at C1.
219. S&P CAPITAL IQ DATABASE, supra note 3. Those who contend that Lehman’s stock price was
inflated through accounting fraud would see no advantage in sales prompted by such a warning. They would
argue that sellers would simply have passed an inevitable loss on to buyers. The SEC investigated Lehman
extensively. It has never filed an enforcement action against the Lehman principals. See Peter J. Henning, Dim
Prospects for Financial Crisis Prosecutions, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2012, 3:13 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/dim-prospects-for-financial-crisis-prosecutions/.
220. See supra notes 10–15 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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that date, Lehman’s stock price closed at $24.20.222 A shareholder selling then would
therefore still have recovered more than twenty-five percent of the initial cost if the
investor had bought at Lehman’s peak 2007–2008 price.223
B.

How To Test Whether the Disclosures, Overall, Warned of a Possible Liquidity
Death

With the two test periods defined, the first question is whether Lehman’s
disclosures—considered overall and without regard to details—suggested a significant
probability that owners of Lehman’s common stock might be wiped out by a liquiditycaused bankruptcy. Importantly, the question is not whether the disclosures portended
hard times in which Lehman’s stock price would decline, but whether the disclosures
suggested a substantial risk of a liquidity heart attack. Did they warn of death, not just
illness?
The market price of Lehman stock cannot guide this investigation. It does not
reveal whether investors were warned of a significant probability of the company’s
demise. Expected value theory teaches that the rational investor will consider the sum
of expected probabilities multiplied by possible returns, plus the profit that the investor
requires.224 Thus, even if a shareholder (or purchaser) at a given time saw a significant
chance that Lehman might collapse, the investor might still have continued to hold the
stock (or buy it) if the investor also saw a significant probability that Lehman would
overcome its problems, with the price of its stock surging as a result.
For example, an owner of Lehman stock on June 20, 2008, who planned to sell in
September (or a buyer purchasing the stock on June 20 who planned to sell in
September) might have been satisfied to hold (or buy) Lehman stock at the $24.20 per
share for which the stock sold on that date if the investor concluded that there was a
50% chance that Lehman would die from want of cash by September 20, but also a
50% chance that Lehman would resolve its business difficulties by that time, with its
stock price reaching $58. That investor would have computed the expected value of the
stock in September as
(.5 x $0) + (.5 x $58) = $29.
With the expected value at $29, and the price at $24.20, this first investor might well
have held Lehman stock (or bought it), even if the investor required a 50% annual
return for doing so, taking into account the extreme volatility of possible outcomes.225
222. S&P CAPITAL IQ DATABASE, supra note 3.
223. A twenty-five percent recovery, of course, means a seventy-five percent loss, which is quite large.
But the question here is not whether warnings could have prevented any loss, or even a large loss. The
question is whether warnings could have enabled an investor who did not want to take the risk of a liquidity
disaster a chance to save some significant portion of its investment. Somewhat arbitrarily, this Article sets that
portion at twenty-five percent for an investor who bought at Lehman’s top price.
224. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 80, at 242–43.
225. See BARUCH FISCHHOFF & JOHN KADVANY, RISK: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 69 (2011)
(explaining that “large losses hurt so much that they have disproportionate (negative) utility”); KLEIN ET AL.,
supra note 80, at 246–50 (explaining premium for volatility risk). Since the three months from June 20 to
September 20 is one-fourth of a year, a 50% annual return translates to 12.5% over the three months. Twelve
and a half percent of $24.20 is $3.025. That amount, added to the $24.20, equals $27.225, which is less than
the $29.00 expected value.

2014]

PREDICTING A HEART ATTACK

497

A second investor might have concluded, on June 20, that there was a 50% chance
that Lehman would still be in business September 20 with its stock trading at $10 per
share, a 50% chance that Lehman would rebound by that time, with its stock up to $48,
and a 0% chance that Lehman would go bust for lack of cash and credit. This second
investor would also have concluded that the stock had an expected value of $29,
computed as
(.5 x $10) + (.5 x $48) + (0 x $0) = $29.
Assuming that it also required a 50% annual return,226 this second investor, like the
first, might well have decided on June 20 to continue to hold Lehman stock at the thencurrent price of $24.20 (or buy it at that price) because the second investor, like the
first, computed the expected value to exceed the price plus required profit.
It is possible that the market settled on the $24.20 per share price on June 20 even
though, like the first investor, buyers and holders saw a significant probability that
Lehman would suffer a cash-deprived cardiac arrest—offset by a similar probability of
a large gain. But it is possible that the market settled on that price because, like the
second investor, buyers and holders foresaw a probability of some decline in the
company’s fortunes—offset by a probability of a large but not jackpot gain—and did
not see any real chance that the firm would run out of cash. Most likely, investors were
mixed—some like the first investor, some like the second, and others with myriad
differing computations involving possible price declines, possible price increases, and
probabilities associated with each. But the stock price does not reveal what proportion
of investors fell into each such category and therefore does not reveal what proportion
of equity investors saw a significant probability that Lehman would suffer a fatal
liquidity collapse.
With the stock price unhelpful, this Article looks elsewhere to discover whether
the information Lehman provided warned its shareholders that their investment might
be completely destroyed by catastrophic illiquidity.227 Specifically, this Article turns to
three sources: stock analysts, credit rating agencies, and the buyers and sellers of credit
default swaps (CDSs). Stock analysts and credit rating agencies provided written
evaluations of Lehman’s prospects.228 What they wrote directly shows whether the

226. Since the volatility is lower in this second example, the second investor would likely have been
satisfied with a lower return.
227. Eventually, stock price information warned of a collapse. Using a very different methodology than
employed in this Article and focusing on bid-ask spreads, two researchers in a recent draft “identify evidence
of market speculation about an imminent failure of Lehman Brothers only in the last week of trading.” Thomas
Gehrig & Marlene Haas, Lehman Brothers: Did Markets Know? 39 (June 2014), available at
http://www.ecgi.org/wp/wp_id.php?id=681 (emphasis added). But the question this Article examines is
whether the market recognized a significant risk of a collapse in time for investors to exit with a substantial
portion of their investment.
228. See, e.g., Mike Mayo & Matt Fischer, Lehman Brothers Holding: 2Q08 EPS in Line with
Pre-Release; Exposures Clearer, DEUTSCHE BANK GLOBAL MKTS. RES. (Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., New York,
N.Y.), June 16, 2008, at 1, 3 [hereinafter Mayo & Fischer, 2Q08 EPS] (providing valuation and assessment of
risks); Douglas Sipkin et al., Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.: Tough Year Ahead—Sowing Seeds for Share
Gains, WACHOVIA EQUITY RES. (Wachovia Capital Mkts., LLC, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 15, 2008, at 1
[hereinafter Sipkin et al., LEH: Tough Year Ahead] (opining that “the stock will trade in a range of $71–72 per
share based on a multiple of 1.8x estimated Q1 2008 book value” and that “[r]isks to this valuation range
include a material decline in primary and secondary debt markets and decreased penetration in European
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analysts or rating agencies foresaw a serious chance of Lehman’s liquidity death. Those
who bought and sold CDSs—protection against Lehman defaulting on its own debt—
would win or lose based solely on whether Lehman ran out of cash. Therefore—albeit
indirectly and only in a crude way—the prices the CDS buyers and sellers paid or
demanded reflected their expectation that Lehman’s cash and credit would evaporate.
If analysis discloses that the information from Lehman’s securities filings
suggested to these other market participants that Lehman ran a significant risk of
liquidity failure, it is fair to infer that the investors in Lehman’s common stock saw the
risk in the same light.229 This test is critical because, if shareholders were adequately
and timely warned of liquidity failure, it may not matter what language Lehman used.
If the warning succeeded, it may not be particularly important to break down the
content of Lehman’s disclosures to find key parts and then analyze those parts closely.
C.

The Failure of the Disclosures, Overall, To Provide a Warning

Turn, then, to the two test periods. In each period, this Part examines what the
stock analysts and credit rating agencies said about Lehman. In each period, it also
examines CDS prices.
1.

January 2008

Stock analysts. Stock analysts collect information about the companies they cover,
issue reports that project those companies’ financial performance, forecast the
companies’ stock price performance against market benchmarks, and recommend that
investors buy, sell, or hold that stock.230 Analysts whose work was readily available
and who covered Lehman throughout 2008 included those at Credit Suisse Equity
Research (Credit Suisse), Deutsche Bank Global Markets Research (Deutsche),
Oppenheimer & Co. Inc. (Oppenheimer), and Wachovia Capital Markets LLC
(Wachovia).
Credit Suisse analysts projected in January 2008 that Lehman would
“Outperform” the market, meaning that the return on Lehman’s stock would exceed the
average in its industry over the next twelve months.231 Just after this first period ended,
markets”).
229. Each of the three indicators has flaws. Equity analysts are often overoptimistic. See Khushbu
Agrawal, Conceptual Framework of Behavioral Biases in Finance, 9 IUP J. BEHAVIORAL FIN. 7, 10 (2012)
(citing studies of analyst overoptimism). But see Armen Hovakimian & Ekkachai Saenyasiri, Conflicts of
Interest and Analyst Behavior: Evidence from Recent Changes in Regulation, 66 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 96, 101
tbl.2 (2010) (showing virtually zero median bias in estimated annual earnings of covered companies in a large
sample during 2003–06). Credit rating agencies received a public flogging in the wake of the credit crisis for
their poor performance in rating mortgage-backed securities and derivatives based upon such securities. FCIC
REPORT, supra note 10, at xxv, 118–22, 146–50, 165, 206–12, 221–24, 242–43. CDS prices may be poor
predictors of default caused by realization of systemic risk.
But the point is not whether any of these indicators were right. Indeed, events proved they were not. The
point is that these indicators provide insight into the risk predictions of Lehman shareholders, which were also
wrong.
230. See Regulation Analyst Certification, Securities Act Release No. 33-8,119, Exchange Act Release
No. 46,301, 67 Fed. Reg. 51,510 (Aug. 8, 2002).
231. See Susan Roth Katzke & Ross Seiden, Lehman Brothers: Credit Suisse Financial Services Forum
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these analysts commented that Lehman was “one of the few” financial firms that had
“maneuvered through this difficult operating environment” “prudently” and “thereby
differentiated itself in terms of risk management.”232 Deutsche analysts advised
investors to “Buy” Lehman stock and said that Lehman’s “culture showed that risk
management is effective.”233 Oppenheimer analysts rated Lehman an “Outperform”
stock that would beat the S&P 500 index over the following twelve to eighteen months
but did include a boilerplate caution that “[a]n extended interruption in liquidity
[would] have a materially adverse impact on earnings.”234 Wachovia analysts
forecasted that Lehman would “Outperform” by yielding overmarket returns during the
next twelve months and said that Lehman was “focused on . . . liquidity.”235
Thus, most of these stock analysts predicted that Lehman stock would do better
than other stocks over the year 2008. Two sets of analysts complimented Lehman’s risk
management. While one set of analysts cautioned in a general way that there was some
risk that a liquidity interruption could hurt earnings, neither that report nor any of the
others told investors that Lehman ran a serious risk of descending into a liquidity death
spiral ending in bankruptcy.
Credit rating agencies. Credit rating agencies expressly evaluate whether a
company will have the cash to pay its bills. There were three principal rating agencies
in 2008: Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s, and Fitch.236 In January 2008, S&P rated
Lehman’s long-term debt A+,237 with the “A” meaning that S&P considered Lehman’s
“capacity to meet [its] financial commitment[s]” on its long-term debt “strong”238 and
the plus sign meaning that Lehman’s debt-paying capacity was better than that of most
companies within the “A” category.239 Moody’s rated Lehman’s long-term debt A1,240
with the “A” signifying “low credit risk” and the “1” putting Lehman’s debt in “the
higher end” of the A-rated group.241 Fitch rated Lehman’s long-term debt AA-,242
which (using Fitch's published ratings distribution a year before) put Lehman in the top

Highlights, CREDIT SUISSE EQUITY RES. (Credit Suisse USA, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 7, 2008, at 1, 3
(explaining an “outperform” rating and showing that Credit Suisse gave Lehman an “outperform” from
October 8, 2007, through the date of report).
232. Id. at 1.
233. Mike Mayo & Matthew Fischer, Lehman Brothers Holding: Meeting with CFO, DEUTSCHE BANK
GLOBAL MKTS. RES. (Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., New York, N.Y.), Jan. 10, 2008, at 1–2 [hereinafter Mayo &
Fischer, Meeting with CFO].
234. Meredith Whitney & Kaimon Chung, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.: Take-Aways from Meeting
with LEH’s New CFO Erin Callan, OPPENHEIMER CO. UPDATE (Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., New York, N.Y.),
Jan. 28, 2008, at 1, 4, 8.
235. Sipkin et al., LEH: Tough Year Ahead, supra note 228, at 1, 4.
236. KOLB, supra note 7, at 32.
237. Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4, at 61.
238. STANDARD & POOR’S, CORPORATE RATINGS CRITERIA 11 (2008) [hereinafter S&P RATINGS
CRITERIA]. A table providing default rate histories over the period 1981–2006 showed that the debt rated “A”
defaulted at only a 0.1% rate in the first year following the rating. Id. at 14.
239. Id. at 12.
240. Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4, at 61.
241. MOODY’S INVESTOR SERV., MOODY’S RATING SYMBOLS AND DEFINITIONS 8 (2008).
242. Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4, at 61.
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eighty percent of all companies rated.243 None of these ratings suggested any
significant probability of a liquidity heart attack and subsequent bankruptcy.
CDS prices. The holders of Lehman debt, like the holders of debt issued by other
companies, could buy CDS protection, which would repay their loss if Lehman
defaulted on its debt. The prices charged for that protection provide the third check on
the expectation that Lehman might completely collapse. The price of CDS protection
does not convert directly into an implied probability of default.244 Benchmark CDS
prices are therefore necessary. As a standard for a CDS price indicating an extreme
danger of imminent default, this Article uses $724,200—the price to protect against
Bear’s default on $10 million of its senior debt, if the protection was purchased on
March 14, 2008, which was effectively Bear’s last day as an independent company.245
On the other end of the spectrum, Exxon Mobil enjoyed a triple-A credit rating
throughout 2008246 and operated at far remove from the turmoil swirling through the
financial firms.247 CDS protection against an Exxon Mobil default averaged $35,040
throughout 2008,248 and this Article uses that figure as the benchmark price for CDS
protection against default by a company displaying extreme credit safety.

243. Credit ratings “express creditworthiness in terms of relative measures of default likelihood.” FITCH
RATINGS, INSIDE THE RATINGS: WHAT CREDIT RATINGS MEAN 2 (2007) [hereinafter FITCH, INSIDE THE
RATINGS]; see also id. at 13 (showing a graph of the distribution of corporate finance issuer ratings as of June
30, 2007).
244. CDS prices depend not only on the probability of default but also on anticipated recovery after a
default and liquidity and regulatory considerations. NOMURA FIXED INCOME RESEARCH, CREDIT DEFAULT
SWAP (CDS) PRIMER 4 (2004). The factors other than probability of default can complicate extraction of that
probability from the price. Moreover, the price of a CDS may emerge from such thin trading that it does not
represent a market judgment. Carrick Mollenkamp & Serena Ng, A Fear Gauge Comes Up Short—Analysis
Shows Credit-Default swaps, a Popular Indicator of Market Health, Are Thinly Traded, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29,
2011, at C1.
245. All CDS prices are taken from Credit Market Analysis data downloaded from S&P’s Capital IQ and
on file with the author and Temple Law Review [hereinafter CMA CDS DATABASE]. Each CDS price used in
this Article is the annual cost, in each of five years, for protection during those years against loss from the
issuer’s default on $10,000,000 par value of the issuer’s senior debt. See Michael Simkovic & Benjamin S.
Kaminetzky, Leveraged Buyout Bankruptcies, the Problem of Hindsight Bias, and the Credit Default Swap
Solution, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 118, 202–203 (2011) (describing the five-year CDS contract and the
Credit Market Analysis database).
The price for such protection on the last day of Bear’s independent existence (Friday, March 14, 2008)
should reflect the price for extreme distress because, by that date, Bear’s condition had already prompted “an
unusual number of customers [to] withdr[a]w funds . . . and a significant number of counterparties and lenders
[to be] unwilling to make secured funding available to Bear Stearns on customary terms.” Bear Proxy
Statement, supra note 10, at 27. Moreover, all three credit rating agencies had downgraded Bear debt, while
also stating that they were considering further downgrades. Id. at 28; see also PAULSON, supra note 14, at 91
(reporting Paulson’s belief that the Bear CDS price during the firm’s last week reflected the “intense pressure”
under which Bear labored).
246. See Exxon Mobil, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 49 (Feb. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Exxon 2008 10K]; Exxon Mobil, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 40 (Feb. 20, 2008).
247. See Exxon 2008 10-K, supra note 246, at 1 (describing Exxon Mobil’s business as “energy,
involving exploration for, and production of, crude oil and natural gas, manufacture of petroleum products and
transportation and sale of crude oil, natural gas and petroleum products” rather than banking or finance).
248. CMA CDS DATABASE, supra note 245.
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The price for a five-year CDS on $10 million of Lehman debt during January
2008 varied between $119,000 and $185,800, ending at $145,500—at all times less
than twenty-six percent of the extreme distress benchmark,249 but at the same time
about four times the benchmark for extreme safety. This suggests that, while those
market participants who were putting their money behind their default predictions
certainly saw some probability of a Lehman meltdown over a five-year horizon, they
did not see a high probability of a short-term liquidity collapse.
2.

March 10 to June 20, 2008

Stock analysts. During the second test period, the Credit Suisse stock analysts
continued to opine that Lehman stock would “Outperform” its industry’s average—
until Lehman announced its second-quarter results (showing a loss and a write-down),
whereupon these analysts downgraded Lehman to “Neutral,” meaning that they
expected its stock to provide a total return within ten percent of the industry average
over the next twelve months.250 The Deutsche analysts said, immediately after Bear’s
crisis, that “Lehman is Not Bear.”251 They continued to rate Lehman a stock to “Buy”
through the end of this second period,252 and in June opined that “‘[l]iquidity is not a
major issue,”253 lauding the increase in Lehman’s “liquidity pool” from $34 billion to
$45 billion during the second quarter.254 Oppenheimer analysts declared, following
Bear’s collapse, that Lehman’s first-quarter numbers “dispelled all doubts of a solvency
crisis at the company.”255 But they reduced their Lehman stock rating from
“Outperform” to “Perform” and maintained that rating into June, also noting favorably
in June the increase in Lehman’s “liquidity pool” and further observing in June that
Lehman had “tested” the new PDCF liquidity backup but “did not have an outstanding
balance [with that backstop] as-of the end 2Q08.”256 The “Perform” rating meant that
the Oppenheimer analysts believed Lehman stock would “perform in line with the S&P

249. Id. CDS price comparisons suffer from the implicit assumption that the percentage recovered by
debt holders after default will be the same at each company. Due to the inaccuracy of that assumption, and for
other reasons, this Article uses CDS prices for only a very crude comparison of creditworthiness of different
companies.
250. See Susan Roth Katzke & Ross Seiden, Lehman Brothers: Recalibrating Expectations, CREDIT
SUISSE EQUITY RES. (Credit Suisse USA, New York, N.Y.), June 10, 2008, at 1 (new rating), 7 (providing a
history of Lehman ratings and explaining “neutral”).
251. Mike Mayo & Matthew Fischer, Lehman Brothers Holding: It Is Not Bear, DEUTSCHE BANK
GLOBAL MKTS. RES. (Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., New York, N.Y.), Mar. 17, 2008, at 1.
252. Mayo & Fischer, 2Q08 EPS, supra note 228, at 1.
253. Mike Mayo & Matthew Fischer, Lehman Brothers Holding: Lowering Estimates, DEUTSCHE BANK
GLOBAL MKTS. RES. (Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., New York, N.Y.), June 5, 2008, at 1.
254. Mike Mayo & Matthew Fischer, Lehman Brothers Holding: 2Q08 Loss, First Take, DEUTSCHE
BANK GLOBAL MKTS. RES. (Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., New York, N.Y.), June 9, 2008, at 1, 2.
255. Meredith Whitney & Kaimon Chung, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.: LEH Dispels Negative
Speculation with 1Q08 Earnings, OPPENHEIMER Q. UPDATE (Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., New York, N.Y.),
Mar. 18, 2008, at 1.
256. Meredith Whitney et al., Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.: LEH 2Q08 Net Results Match PreAnnouncement, OPPENHEIMER EQUITY RES. Q. UPDATE (Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., New York, N.Y.), June 17,
2008, at 22 [hereinafter Whitney et al., LEH 2Q08 Net Results] (showing a chart of rating history, with a
change to “Perform” on March 24); id. at 1, 4 (quotation and observation that liquidity pool increased).
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500 within the next 12–18 months.”257 Wachovia analysts rated Lehman “Outperform”
until the company released second-quarter results, when they downgraded Lehman to
“Market Perform,” meaning that investors owning Lehman stock should hold it
because the total return from that stock over the next twelve months “will be in line
with the market.”258 On June 16, these analysts said that Lehman’s “improved . . .
liquidity position should go a long way to calming market fears.”259
Read together, the stock analyst reports recognized that Lehman was experiencing
trouble by June 20, 2008, with most of the analysts reducing their ratings for Lehman
stock. But even these analysts predicted that Lehman stock would perform in line with
the market. None of the reports suggested any serious probability that Lehman would
follow Bear into a liquidity emergency. To the contrary, the reports suggested that
Lehman’s liquidity was improving.
Credit rating agencies. Turning to the credit rating agencies, S&P kept Lehman’s
credit rating at A+ until June 2008, when it lowered the rating to A, with a negative
outlook.260 While S&P commented that the rating might decline further if Lehman
suffered “substantial losses” or if “the firm’s ability to sustain potential liquidity
stresses should weaken,”261 the A rating reflected S&P’s judgment that Lehman’s
“capacity to meet its financial commitment[s]” on its long-term debt remained
“strong,” and the negative outlook did not necessarily mean that the rating would fall
further.262 Moody’s reaffirmed and maintained its A1 rating on Lehman (low credit
risk) throughout the second time period but announced a negative outlook on that rating
after Lehman published its second-quarter financial numbers.263 Moody’s added during
Bear’s crisis that “Lehman has consistently been among the top financial institutions at

257. Id. at 23.
258. See Douglas Sipkin et al., Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.: LEH Hosts Earnings Call—Long-Term
Story Still Intact, WACHOVIA EQUITY RES. (Wachovia Capital Mkts., LLC, New York, N.Y.), June 16, 2008, at
1, 5 [hereinafter Sipkin et al., LEH Hosts Earnings Call] (showing rating still at “market perform”); Douglas
Sipkin et al., Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.: LEH Pre-Announces, Too Many Inconsistencies—Downgrading
Rating, WACHOVIA EQUITY RES. (Wachovia Capital Mkts., LLC, New York, N.Y.), June 10, 2008, at 1, 6
(downgrading Lehman to “market perform” and explaining that rating); Douglas Sipkin et al., Lehman
Brothers Holdings, Inc.: Lehman Defies Between Skeptics…Again, WACHOVIA EQUITY RES. (Wachovia
Capital Mkts., LLC, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 19, 2008, at 1 (showing “outperform” rating after Bear).
259. Sipkin et al., LEH Hosts Earnings Call, supra note 258, at 1.
260. Diane Hinton et al., Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Rating Lowered to “A” from “A+”; Outlook
Negative, STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGSDIRECT (Standard & Poor’s, New York, N.Y.), June 2, 2008, at 2.
261. Id. at 3.
262. S&P RATINGS CRITERIA, supra note 238, at 11, 15 (explaining that a negative outlook does not
necessarily precede a rating change but does mean that the rating “may be lowered”). S&P commented that
Lehman’s outlook “could be revised to stable if [its] operating performance rebounds to more normal levels.”
Hinton et al., supra note 260, at 3.
263. Blaine A. Frantz & Robert Young, Moody’s Affirms Lehman’s A1 Rating; Outlook Now Stable,
MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE (Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc., New York, N.Y.), Mar. 17, 2008, at 1
[hereinafter Frantz & Young, Moody’s Affirms Lehman’s A1 Rating]; Blaine A. Frantz & Robert Young,
Moody’s Changes Lehman’s Rating Outlook to Negative, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE (Moody’s Investors
Serv., Inc., New York, N.Y.), June 9, 2008, at 1 [hereinafter Frantz & Young, Moody’s Changes Lehman’s
Rating]; Blaine A. Frantz & Robert Young, Moody’s Places Lehman’s A1 Rating on Review for Downgrade:
Prime-1 Affirmed, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE (Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc., New York, N.Y.), June 13,
2008, at 1 [hereinafter Frantz & Young, Moody’s Places Lehman’s A1 Rating on Review].
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managing risk, including market, credit and liquidity risks,”264 and Moody’s stated
repeatedly during this second period—including at the end—that Lehman’s standalone
liquidity position “remain[ed] robust,” commenting as well that the PDCF backstop
helped dispel liquidity doubts.265 After reaffirming its AA- rating on Lehman’s longterm debt in April, but at the same time revising the ratings outlook to negative,266
Fitch reduced that rating after Lehman announced second-quarter results in June—
dropping Lehman from AA- to A+ (and keeping a negative outlook), which still left
Lehman (by Fitch’s published distribution a year before) in the top fifty percent of
companies Fitch rated.267 Even as it took these steps, Fitch commented in April that it
believed “Lehman has managed its liquidity particularly well in the last eight months”
and that Lehman’s “[l]iquidity remains strong.”268 Fitch added in June that “Lehman’s
liquidity position solidly covers its short-term needs and was recently bolstered by the
introduction of the [PDCF].”269
Like the stock analysts, the credit rating agencies therefore reacted to Lehman’s
declining financial results with downgrades in the second period. But the agencies still
rated Lehman as a low-risk debtor. One agency called Lehman’s liquidity “robust” and
another called Lehman’s liquidity “solid[].”270 Two concluded that the new PDCF
reduced liquidity concerns. Nothing in the revised ratings or the accompanying
explanations suggested a substantial probability that Lehman’s access to cash would
dry up and that the company would go to the graveyard as a result.
CDS prices. Market participants risking their money by buying or selling CDS
protection against a Lehman default again took a more cautious view. The cost of CDS
protection on Lehman debt rose to $459,600 on March 14, 2008, just as Bear was
apparently going down for the count.271 But by the end of the following week, the price
dropped back to $262,500.272 After then rising to a high of $295,000 on March 28, the
CDS price fell again and ended on June 20 at $254,500.273

264. Frantz & Young, Moody’s Affirms Lehman’s A1 Rating, supra note 263, at 1.
265. See id. (noting that “Lehman’s liquidity management and position remain robust”); Frantz &
Young, Moody’s Changes Lehman’s Rating, supra note 263, at 1 (stating that the “supportive actions of the
Federal Reserve, including the temporary introduction of the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (‘PDCF’) . . . have
played a critical role in helping to stabilize funding markets in the wake of the Bear Stearns collapse.”); Frantz
& Young, Moody’s Places Lehman’s A1 Rating on Review, supra note 263, at 1 (referring to the PDCF and
Lehman’s $45 billion liquidity pool and repeating that “Lehman’s liquidity management and stand-alone
liquidity position remain robust”).
266. Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch Revises Outlook on Lehman Brothers to Negative: Affirms
‘AA-/F1+’ IDRs (Apr. 1, 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Fitch April Press Release].
267. Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch Downgrades Lehman Brothers’ L-T & S-T IDRs to “A+/F1”;
Outlook Negative (June 9, 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Fitch June Press Release]; FITCH, INSIDE
THE RATINGS, supra note 243, at 13 (graph showing distribution of corporate finance issuer ratings as of June
30, 2007).
268. Fitch April Press Release, supra note 266, at 1.
269. Fitch June Press Release, supra note 267.
270. Frantz & Young, Moody’s Affirms Lehman’s A1 Rating, supra note 263, at 1; Fitch June Press
Release, supra note 267.
271. CMA CDS DATABASE, supra note 245.
272. Id.
273. Id.
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Thus, during the second test period, CDS buyers and sellers again saw some
probability of a Lehman default, with the CDS price well above the $35,040 extreme
credit safety benchmark. Indeed, CDS protection against a Lehman default cost more
than seven times the benchmark price for a company displaying extreme credit safety.
But the prices for a five-year CDS on Lehman’s debt during and at the end of the
second period were still far below the $724,200 extreme distress benchmark (ending at
only thirty-five percent of that extreme distress figure), so the pricing did not suggest
an extremely high risk of a liquidity demise at any time during the next five years.
Moreover the CDS prices came down between Bear’s demise and the end of the second
period, indicating that—as Lehman’s death came closer—those pricing protection
against it saw that death as less probable.
In sum, the stock analysts and credit rating professionals, who provided their
evaluations in writing, did not see—in either test period—any serious probability that
Lehman would fall victim to a liquidity heart attack. The buyers and sellers of CDS
protection against a Lehman default did see a risk, but they saw that risk declining as
the second period drew to a close, and they never saw the risk as extreme. Assuming
that the holders of Lehman common stock analyzed the information Lehman disclosed
in roughly the same manner as did these other participants in the financial world, those
shareholders, too, included some who interpreted the disclosed information to portend
some risk of Lehman running out of cash, some who did not, and even among those
who did see a real risk, many who concluded that the risk declined after Bear’s distress.
Tested as a whole, then, Lehman’s disclosures failed to provide widespread warning
that the firm ran a very significant risk of liquidity death in the short run.274 The market
did not, from the Lehman’s disclosures, predict a heart attack.
D.

The Failure of the Disclosures To Warn of Triparty Repo Risks

Having determined that Lehman’s disclosures did not—considering their effect
rather than their content—warn of liquidity death, this Part turns to content.
Specifically, it asks whether the disclosures relating to triparty repo transactions
revealed the risks that the repos posed.
1.

January 2008

In January 2008, Lehman filed its 10-K for the fiscal year 2007.275 The word
“triparty” did not appear anywhere in that filing.276 While the 10-K included a number
for “Securities sold under agreement to repurchase” ($181.732 billion at the end of
fiscal 2007),277 that number did not match the number that Lehman provided months

274. This does not mean that the disclosures violated the securities laws. It means only that the
disclosures did not produce a consensus in the investment community that Lehman faced extreme liquidity
risk.
275. Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4, at 1.
276. Nor were triparty repos mentioned in the conference call on the last quarter of 2007, which
preceded the first time period. Lehman Bros., Inc., Conference Call: Fourth Quarter Earnings (Dec. 13, 2007)
(transcript on file with author).
277. Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4, at 87.
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later for the 2007 year-end triparty repos ($230 billion).278 So investors could not even
see the amount of triparty repo financing.
Since the 10-K did not even refer to triparty repos, it did not describe their
structure. In particular, Lehman did not describe the morning unwind and the extension
by JPM of billions of dollars in credit to substitute during the day for lender financing
overnight. The 10-K gave no hint that JPM unwound and extended intraday credit at its
sole discretion, or that JPM could—by threatening not to unwind—effectively demand
haircuts and a collateral cushion that would reduce the cash at Lehman’s disposal.279
Similarly, the 10-K did not describe the triparty repo lenders. It did not suggest
that those lenders, in the face of some combination of bad news about Lehman, might
simply refuse to loan to Lehman at all instead of adjusting terms to account for the
increased default risk that the bad news implied. Lehman thus gave no hint that any
significant number of its lenders might be information insensitive until shock.
The 10-K did state that Lehman’s Capital Markets operations included an “equity
and fixed income matched book,”280 and described that business as one in which
Lehman sought to make “profits from the difference between interest earned and
interest paid.”281 The 10-K further stated that the matched book “typically” involved
high-quality collateral—“government or government agency securities.”282 But the
filing said nothing about the possibility that a lender pullback might leave Lehman
without lending from the triparty market to finance the matched loans in the bilateral
market, even when the matched transactions rested on government securities.
All of this does not mean that Lehman ignored liquidity risk. To the contrary,
Lehman’s 10-K defined “liquidity” as “ready access to funds”283 and “liquidity risk” as
“the potential that we are unable to: [m]eet our payment obligations when due;
[b]orrow funds in the market on an on-going basis and at an acceptable price to fund
actual or proposed commitments; or [l]iquidate assets in a timely manner at a
reasonable price.”284 The filing expressly listed “Liquidity Risk” among the company’s
“Risk Factors.”285 As partial protection against that risk, Lehman said that it maintained
a “liquidity pool” that was sized to “cover[] expected cash outflows for twelve months
in a stressed liquidity environment.”286 That pool consisted of assets that the company

278. Lehman 2Q 10-Q, supra note 23, at 84.
279. JPM’s securities filings did not fill this gap, as they, too, did not mention triparty repos or describe
the morning unwind or the related intraday loan. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Aug.
11, 2008); JPMorgan Chase & Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (May 12, 2008); JPMorgan Chase & Co.,
Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 29, 2008).
280. Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4, at 4, 6.
281. Id. at 6.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 17.
284. Id. at 75.
285. Id. at 17; see also id. at 37 (“While our liquidity strategy seeks to ensure that we maintain sufficient
liquidity to meet all of our funding obligations in all markets, our liquidity could be impaired by an inability to
access secured and/or unsecured debt markets, an inability to access funds from our subsidiaries, an inability to
sell assets or unforeseen outflows of cash or collateral.”).
286. Id. at 56.
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could quickly convert to cash.287 Lehman reported the pool to total $35 billion at the
end of fiscal 2007.288
Carefully read, however, the 10-K suggested that the liquidity pool was never
intended to substitute for repo financing—whether triparty or otherwise. True, Lehman
said that the pool would cover not only the “repayment of . . . unsecured debt” but also
“[t]he anticipated impact of adverse changes on secured funding—either in the form of
a greater difference between the market and pledge value of assets (also known as
‘haircuts’) or in the form of reduced borrowing availability.”289 But Lehman also said
that it managed liquidity risk by “[r]elying on secured funding only to the extent that
we believe it would be available in all market environments.”290 More explicitly, the
company stated that “[e]ven within the one-year time frame contemplated by our
liquidity pool, we depend on continuous access to secured financing in the repurchase .
. . market[], which could be impaired by factors that are not specific to Lehman
Brothers, such as a severe disruption of the financial markets.”291 If anything, then,
Lehman—instead of warning that its clearing bank and lenders might drain the firm’s
liquidity—at least implied in January 2008 that repo financing was solid and would not
significantly decline due to Lehman-specific problems.
2.

March 10 to June 20, 2008

In the second test period, Lehman announced the financial results for the first
quarter of its 2008 fiscal year, hosted a conference call to discuss those numbers, and
filed the Form 10-Q for that first quarter.292 Later in this period, Lehman made an early
announcement of estimated second-quarter financial results, then announced the
financial results for its second quarter and hosted two conference calls to discuss that
quarter.293 The second period ends before Lehman filed the related 10-Q.294
The triparty repo disclosures during this second test period were still quite thin.
The press release announcing the first-quarter results did not include the word
“repurchase” at all.295 Like the 10-K in the first time period, the Lehman 10-Q for the
first quarter included a figure for “Securities sold under agreements to repurchase” but
did not break out triparty repos.296 The conference call for the first-quarter results
provided a figure for triparty repos ($115 billion) that was apparently “exclusive of the

287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.; see also id. at 37 (recognizing that “our liquidity could be impaired by an inability to access
secured and/or unsecured debt markets”) (emphasis added)).
290. Id. at 75 (emphasis added).
291. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
292. Lehman 1Q 10-Q, supra note 21; Lehman Press Release Mar. 18, 2008, supra note 21; Lehman
First Quarter Conference Call, supra note 21.
293. Lehman Press Release June 9, 2009, supra note 23; Lehman Press Release June 16, 2008, supra
note 23; June 10 Preliminary Q2 Figures Call, supra note 216; Lehman Second Quarter Conference Call,
supra note 23.
294. Lehman 2Q 10-Q, supra note 23.
295. Lehman Press Release Mar. 18, 2008, supra note 21.
296. Lehman 1Q 10-Q, supra note 21, at 6.
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match book,”297 different from the 10-Q’s number for “Securities sold under
agreements to repurchase” ($197.128 billion),298 and different again from the triparty
number for the first quarter that Lehman published after the second period ended ($230
billion).299 So the total amount of triparty repo financing at the end of Lehman’s first
2008 quarter was virtually impossible to see.
The press releases announcing the results for the second quarter did not mention
repurchase agreements.300 In the second conference call about that quarter, the
company said that it had approximately $188 billion in “[t]otal repo . . . , of which
matchbook and customer funding is between one third and a half with remainder firm
inventory” and then provided a figure of $105 billion for triparty repo.301 It was only
after the second period that the company said that the full $188 billion had been
triparty.302 Putting aside any rationale for these different numbers,303 the total triparty
repo number thus remained unclear even at the end of the second period.
As was true during the first period, none of Lehman’s disclosures during the
second period included any description of JPM’s role as a clearing bank. In particular,
Lehman did not describe the morning unwind and intraday loan, the discretionary
nature of that loan, and the power that the unwind and discretionary loan provided to
JPM. And nothing addressed the possibility that JPM would use that power to require
intraday haircuts or a collateral cushion.
As was true in the first period, Lehman did not disclose in the second period that
lenders might be information insensitive until shock. But the second-period disclosures
did recognize that lenders might flee. Thus, while Lehman again referred to its
“liquidity pool” and again stated that that pool was “sized to cover” a twelve-month
liquidity squeeze,304 Lehman omitted the qualifier statement that the company assumed
continuing access to repo financing during such a one-year cash drought.
Instead, Lehman now suggested that its liquidity pool could cover any lender
flight. During the conference call discussing final second-quarter results, Lehman
explicitly broke down triparty repos and stated that—excluding high-quality securities
(many of which the PDCF would finance) and repos between Lehman subsidiaries—
only $32 billion of triparty repos remained.305 Most of this financing consisted of term
297. See Lehman First Quarter Conference Call, supra note 21, at 10 (Erin Callan, CFO, stating: “Total
repo exclusive of the match book was $215 billion of which a substantial majority of this collateral is eligible
to be pledged under the new Fed facility. We have $115 billion of tie [sic] party secured financing which is
really just the total repo amount less treasuries and agencies which go through the FICC system
anonymously.”). This transcript contains a typographical error, substituting “tie” for “tri.” See the transcript of
this call prepared by CCBN, Inc. and FDCH e-Media, Inc. at 12 (on file with author).
298. Lehman 1Q 10-Q, supra note 21, at 6.
299. Lehman 2Q 10-Q, supra note 23, at 84.
300. Lehman Press Release June 9, 2008, supra note 23; Lehman Press Release June 16, 2008, supra
note 23.
301. Lehman Second Quarter Conference Call, supra note 23, at 14 (Ian Lowitt, CFO).
302. Lehman 2Q 10-Q, supra note 23, at 84.
303. The company may have provided the somewhat confusing numbers quite innocently—simply
taking out the matched book to advise investors that $105 billion of triparty repo financed those securities that
Lehman itself owned as inventory or proprietary investments.
304. Lehman 1Q 10-Q, supra note 21, at 65.
305. CFO Ian Lowitt said:
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repos, with an average length of over forty days, and, more importantly, Lehman said
that “[a]ny loss of repo capacity may be absorbed” by the liquidity pool.306 Lehman
stated that that pool—which could be turned quickly into cash if necessary—had risen
to $45 billion.307
The figures that Lehman provided in the conference call on final second-quarter
results alerted shareholders to the circumstance that one-third to one-half of the triparty
deals were matched transactions.308 Since Lehman had disclosed back in January that
the matched book deals typically involved high-quality government or government
agency securities,309 the assurance that its liquidity pool would only be needed to
provide non-repo funding for securities of lesser quality suggested that the matched
book was insulated from liquidity problems.
In sum, Lehman disclosed in the second period nothing of the risk that its clearing
bank might insist on crippling additions to its collateral cushion, and, while Lehman at
least recognized the risk of a lender pullback, it implied that—with the help of the new
government liquidity backstop and its liquidity pool—the firm could successfully
manage that risk.
E.

The Failure of the Disclosures To Warn of Endgame Risks

As set out in Part I.C.2, Lehman’s endgame failed because Lehman did not—in
the last few desperate days of its life—merge into a healthier company. While the U.S.

With respect to our secured funding position, total repo is approximately $188 billion, of which
match book and customer funding is between one-third and a half, with the remainder firm
inventory. Of this amount, approximately $83 billion is treasuries and agencies. The remaining $105
million [sic] is tri-party repo, of which approximately $40 billion consists of central bank eligible
collateral.
Of the remaining $65 billion of repo, $25 billion is in investment grade, fixed income securities
and major index equities, for which there exists a very active, reliable, and liquid repo market, and a
further $8 billion of assets are funded within our own banks. The remaining $32 billion of collateral
is funded largely with term facilities. The average [tenor] of our non-central bank eligible tri-party
repo is now over 40 days. Any loss of repo capacity may be absorbed within our pools of liquidity
available to the broker dealers, which represent more than 150% of the remaining repo.
Additionally, we have over-funded the tri-party repo book by approximately $27 billion. That is, we
have repo’d out collateral in excess of firm and client positions, filling this by substituting treasuries
and agencies in the U.S. and borrowing in collateral in Europe. This gives us the ability to absorb
changes in repo capacity in times of stress by reducing total collateral borrowed in or reallocating
the higher quality, easy-to-fund collateral outside these facilities as necessary.
Lehman Second Quarter Conference Call, supra note 23, at 14.
The Treasuries, agency debt, central-bank eligible instruments, and investment-grade fixed-income
securities all appeared to qualify for PDCF lending. Initial PDCF Terms, supra note 165. Lowitt’s reference
to liquidity pools available to the broker dealer subsidiaries probably takes into account not only the holding
company’s then $45 billion pool, Lehman Second Quarter Conference Call, supra note 23, at 14 (Ian Lowitt,
CFO), but also the separate liquidity pools maintained by those subsidiaries. Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4,
at 57 n.1 to tbl.
306. Lehman Second Quarter Conference Call, supra note 23, at 14 (Ian Lowitt, CFO).
307. Id. at 13–14 (Ian Lowitt, CFO).
308. See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 282 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the Lehman 10-K indicated that
the matched book deals involved high-quality collateral, such as government agency securities.
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government looked for a merger partner and found BofA, the government would not
for Lehman (as it had for Bear) put money into the deal to make a BofA deal work.
And the last-ditch Barclays’ option fell apart because a British regulator, the FSA,
would not waive the requirement for a shareholder vote to approve a guarantee
necessary for the Lehman-Barclays deal. This Part turns now to whether Lehman
disclosed these risks.
1.

January 2008

In the 10-K it filed in the first test period, Lehman failed to provide any endgame
discussion.310 It made no public reference to the risks it would face if forced to seek an
emergency merger to avoid collapse. It therefore provided no discussion of the chances
for (and obstacles to) overcoming those risks, consummating a merger, and thereby
salvaging at least something for the shareholders.
Lehman did not even identify the government actors that might play an endgame
role. The 10-K listed regulators that supervised Lehman—including the SEC, the
NYSE, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.311 Lehman also identified
foreign regulators, including the FSA, which regulated overseas subsidiaries.312 None
of that discussion, however, addressed the role that any of these agencies might play in
arranging an emergency merger to avoid liquidity death. And the 10-K did not mention
the U.S. Department of the Treasury at all, or the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
in any significant way313—even though both took center stage in last-minute efforts to
save the firm.314
2.

March 10 to June 20

During the second test period, Lehman filed a 10-Q on April 9 that again referred
to regulators but added nothing to the disclosures in January.315 Like the January 10-K,
the April 10-Q did not mention Treasury even once and included only passing
comments on the FSA and the U.S. Federal Reserve.316 Neither of these documents,
nor the press releases announcing the first- and second-quarter financial results, nor
related conference calls, included even a word addressing a survival endgame.
310. Lehman did say that it had “developed and regularly update[d] a Funding Action Plan [FAP], which
represents a detailed action plan to manage a stress liquidity event.” Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4, at 60.
But the FAP was not an endgame strategy for a liquidity crisis during which Lehman might have to sell itself
rather than fall into bankruptcy. The FAP was instead intended to forestall such an endgame altogether, which
it did not do. In any event, the FAP does not appear to have played any significant role as Lehman died. The
Examiner’s Report, which devoted over 100 pages to “Lehman’s Survival Strategies and Efforts,” did not
mention the FAP even once. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 609–726.
311. Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4, at 10–11.
312. Id. at 11, 13–14, 134.
313. The 10-K mentions the Federal Reserve only twice. See id. at 20 (referring to “the interest rate and
monetary policies of the Federal Reserve Board”); id. at 35 (discussing Federal Reserve interest rate changes).
314. See supra notes 189–213 and accompanying text.
315. Lehman 1Q 10-Q, supra note 21, at 36–37. The 10-Q also again referred to the FAP. Id. at 69.
316. See id. at 46 (stating that the U.S. Federal Reserve had reduced interest rates and created the
PDCF); id. at 36 (stating that the FSA regulated Lehman’s European broker-dealer).
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III. WHAT TO MAKE OF IT
The failure of Lehman’s disclosures to alert the market to the risk of a liquidity
heart attack leads inevitably to the question of whether Lehman realistically could have
provided timely warning of extreme liquidity risk. This Section addresses that question.
Part A examines whether, realistically, Lehman could have warned of the extreme risks
that triparty repos posed to the firm’s liquidity. Part B considers whether, realistically,
Lehman could have warned of the extreme risks posed by playing out an endgame.
After both Parts A and B conclude that effective and timely disclosure was not
possible, Part C draws the analysis together and identifies the factors that put timely
risk warnings effectively out of reach.
A.

Frustration of Triparty Repo Risk Disclosure

Lehman’s disclosures failed to tell shareholders the magnitude of Lehman’s
triparty repo business, failed to describe triparty repo transactions, failed to warn that
JPM could use its power from the unwind to extract haircuts and a collateral cushion,
and failed to caution that lenders might be insensitive to bad news about Lehman until
that news reached some unpredictable critical mass, whereupon the lenders might
desert Lehman instead of continuing to lend but tightening terms.317 Consider whether
Lehman could have provided timely warning that such risks were present and might
mature.
1.

January 2008

It is hard to see how Lehman—in January 2008—could have revealed the facts
that created the key repo risks. Certainly, Lehman could have given a triparty repo
number for the end of its fiscal 2007 year, could have revealed the extent to which
triparty repos provided the liquidity for the matched book, and could have described the
unwind, which effectively put all triparty repos (even those with multiday terms) at risk
every twenty-four hours. Those disclosures would have alerted Lehman shareholders to
the fact that a very significant part of Lehman’s business depended on extremely shortterm financing. With those disclosures, shareholders might have deduced the
possibility that something could quickly go wrong in a big way on the liquidity front.
But such general textual warnings would hardly have given shareholders facts by which
they could have deduced not just the possibility, but a significant probability, that
triparty repos would lead to a liquidity disaster.
In January, Lehman simply did not have—and therefore could not have
disclosed—the specific facts from which shareholders could have deduced such a
probability. It was not until February that JPM advised Lehman that JPM would require
any daytime haircuts and not until June that JPM demanded any collateral cushion.318
Similarly, the repo market had been operating efficiently for years by January 2008,319
317. See supra Part II.D for a discussion of Lehman’s disclosures about triparty repos.
318. See supra notes 103–17 and accompanying text for a discussion of JPM’s decision to impose
haircuts and demand a collateral cushion and JPM’s communication of these requirements to Lehman.
319. See Acharya & Öncü, supra note 33, at 320 (describing how repos had become an attractive
financing option since regulatory changes in the 1980s).
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and the financing world did not yet know that some lenders might suddenly react to bad
news about a dealer by ceasing to lend to that dealer altogether—even against very
high-quality collateral—effectively acting as if they were making unsecured rather than
secured loans.320
Importantly, no securities law or regulation required Lehman to conduct an
investigation to discover these facts. True, U.S. securities protocols sometimes demand
(and demanded in 2008) that a public company disclose—in its own filings—
information about other companies. For example, a public company must disclose (and
was required in 2008 to disclose) the dependence of any segment of its business “upon
a single customer, or a few customers, the loss of any one or more of which would have
a material adverse effect on the segment,” and provide the name of any customer the
sales to which comprise ten percent or more of the company’s consolidated
revenues.321 And a company must today describe (and in 2008 was required to
describe) “[c]ompetitive conditions,” including (if the company “knows or has reason
to know” them) the name(s) of any “one or a small number of competitors” who are
“dominant” in the company’s industry.322 But these are all objective facts that the filing
company knows about other companies, or can easily determine.
Going further, securities regulations require (and required in 2008) a public
company to disclose the danger that a counterparty will take future action adverse to
the company when the filing company has facts that clearly show that danger. Thus,
Item 303 of Regulation S-K mandates (and mandated in 2008) that a company disclose
“any known trends or uncertainties that have had or that the [company] reasonably
expects will have a material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or
income from continuing operations.”323 To comply with Item 303, a company for
example must warn its stockholders if it (i) “know[s] that a material government
contract is about to expire[,] . . . [and (ii) is] uncertain as to whether the contract will be
renewed [because the company (a)] . . . . know[s] that a competitor has found a way to
provide the same service or product at a price less than that charged by the [company or
(b)] . . . ha[s] been advised by the government that the contract [might] not be

320. When lenders suddenly pulled back from Bear in March, that swift retrenchment came as a shock.
See Hearing on “The Shadow Banking System” Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n 78–79 (May 5, 2010)
(COMMISSIONER HOLTZ-EAKIN: “Another question I’ve just been confused by. Why in the moment, even
if you had Treasuries as your collateral, were people unwilling to do repo with you? And why didn’t the
haircuts just adjust to continue to give you access?” WITNESS MOLINARO: “That’s a question that we were
asking ourselves in that period of time. We were surprised by the way that this was happening.”), available at
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0505-Transcript.pdf; The Shadow Banking
System: Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n 3 (May 5, 2010) (statement of Paul Friedman, former
chief operating officer of fixed income Bear Stearns) (“During the week of March 10, 2008, Bear Sterns
suffered from a run on the bank that resulted . . . from an unwarranted loss of confidence in the firm by certain
of its customers, lenders and counterparties . . . . [which resulted in, among other things,] repo market lenders
declin[ing] to roll over or renew repo loans, even when the loans were supported by high-quality collateral
such as agency securities . . . .”), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcictestimony/2010-0505-Friedman.pdf. See also supra note 149 for a discussion of the overreliance on short-term
secured funding and its presumed stability in the triparty repo market.
321. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(vii) (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(vii) (2008).
322. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(x) (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(x) (2008).
323. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2008).
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renewed.”324 But these obligations are by their terms limited to dangers reasonably
foreseeable from known facts and do not include an obligation to investigate to find
facts.325
None of these regulations obligated Lehman to try to discover JPM’s future
intentions regarding haircuts or collateral cushions or the as-yet-unrevealed nature of
lenders who would prove to be information insensitive until shock. Moreover, the
philosophy behind the limited requirements to disclose information about other
companies has made courts leery of interpreting disclosure rules in ways that punish a
first company for failing to report the plans of a second.326 This reluctance reflects a
recognition that the first company may be unable to accurately discover the intentions
of the second.327 Put simply, one company cannot read the mind of another.
That same concern suggests that it would have been a bad idea to have required
Lehman to speculate as to JPM’s future haircut and collateral cushion demands or
lenders’ future inclinations—in the face of bad news about Lehman—to decline loans
altogether rather than to adjust terms to compensate for higher risk. JPM might have
declined, for business reasons, to suggest to an important customer that new and
possibly huge liquidity hits were on the way until JPM determined that the steps that
would hurt Lehman were necessary for JPM’s own protection. Similarly, lenders who
were regularly renewing overnight repos with Lehman on terms that benefited the
lenders might have been wary of telling Lehman that they might suddenly and
unpredictably bail out if publicity about Lehman turned sour. In the face of these
incentives by counterparties to conceal their plans and intentions that could strangle
Lehman’s liquidity, it would have been unfair, and most likely fruitless, to have
imposed on Lehman a requirement that it deduce, and then disclose, what JPM and
overnight lenders would do.

324. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303; Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 33-6,835, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-26,831, Investment Company Act Release No. 16,961, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427 (May 24, 1989)
(emphasis added).
325. See J & R Mktg. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 549 F.3d 384, 391–92 (6th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal
where the plaintiff alleged that a company should have disclosed in its offering documents that its parent had
overstated cash flows and otherwise misrepresented its financial condition and results, as well as rejecting
interpretation of 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1) to reach matters that are “knowable” and so impose a “duty to first
investigate and then disclose” and holding that “the duty of disclosure arising from Item 303 require[s]
knowledge”).
326. See In re Adams Golf, Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 267, 278 (3d Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal of
case insofar as plaintiffs alleged that the defendant’s offering documents should have disclosed oversupply at
retailers of competitors’ golf clubs and stating that “the securities laws obligated Adams Golf to disclose
material information concerning its own business and not necessarily the details relating to its competitors”).
327. See In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1407 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of a case
based on the defendant’s failure to include in its offering documents that Microsoft was about to introduce a
product that would preempt the market and stating that “[w]e agree with Stac that another company’s plans
cannot be known to a certainty. Even assuming, as we must, that Microsoft had informed Stac that it planned
to introduce data compression, Stac could not have known whether or not Microsoft would truly do so.”).
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March 10 to June 20, 2008

During the second test period, as during the first, Lehman could have disclosed
the amount of its triparty repo financing in straightforward terms, could have described
the discretionary morning unwind and intraday loan, could have revealed the power
that the unwind gave to JPM to impose haircuts or require a collateral cushion, and
could have told its shareholders that such haircuts and such a cushion would erode
Lehman’s liquidity. Lehman’s failure to do any of that seems strange because—during
this second period—Lehman knew that JPM would be exercising its power in just this
way. JPM told Lehman in February (before the second test period began) that it would
require haircuts equal to those imposed by the overnight lenders,328 and JPM advised
Lehman in early June (before the second period ended) that it would require a collateral
cushion.329
It would be possible to read the securities laws and regulations to have required
Lehman to disclose at least the haircuts and collateral cushion that JPM demanded
before and during the second period and the liquidity risks they posed. For example,
Item 303(a)(1) requires (and required in 2008) that a company identify “any known
demands . . . that will result in or that are reasonably likely to result in the [company’s]
liquidity increasing or decreasing in any material way.”330 And Item 503(c) requires
(and required in 2008) that a public company discuss “the most significant factors that
make the [company] . . . risky.”331 Lehman’s 10-Q filed on April 9 very arguably
should have included the JPM haircut demand in order to comply with Items 303(a)(1)
and 503(c).332 And that disclosure, in order be complete, very arguably should have
stated that the haircuts would, dollar for dollar, reduce Lehman’s NFE and thereby
reduce Lehman’s liquidity.
Moreover, the securities laws generally require (and required in 2008) that, when
a company makes a statement on a subject, it must include all material facts necessary
in order to avoid misleading investors by material omission.333 Thus, all the statements
in the second period relating to liquidity and the adequacy of Lehman’s liquidity pool
arguably should have included the information that Lehman had—at the time of the
statements—about JPM’s haircut and collateral cushion requirements. Since JPM had
advised Lehman of the coming daytime haircuts in February, this rule arguably
required Lehman to disclose those haircuts in the April 9 10-Q’s liquidity discussion.
328. See supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text.
330. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1) (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1) (2008).
331. 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2008).
332. Item 303(b) required that Form 10-Q include any “material changes” in financial condition from the
end of Lehman’s 2007 fiscal year (Nov. 30, 2007) through the end of the first quarter of 2008 (Feb. 28, 2007).
17 C.F.R. § 229.303(b)(1) (2008); JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. ET AL., FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS: SELECTED
STATUTES, RULES AND FORMS 1552 (2008). Similarly, Form 10-Q required the 10-Q to “[s]et forth any
material changes from risk factors . . . in the . . . 10-K.” COFFEE ET AL., supra, at 1553. And Form 10-K
required Item 503(c) risk factors. Id. at 1562. The Lehman 10-K did not refer to clearing bank collateral
demands in its risk factors. Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4, at 14–22. Lehman’s 10-Q for the first quarter
stated that there were “no material changes” in the risk factors the 10-K had included. Lehman 1Q 10-Q, supra
note 21, at 89.
333. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b), 12b-20 (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b), 12b-20 (2008).
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The rule that statements must not mislead by material omissions also arguably required
Lehman—in its discussion of the liquidity pool during the June 16 conference call—to
state that JPM was requiring daytime haircuts and had advised on June 2 that it
required billions as a collateral cushion and that these requirements had and would
reduce Lehman’s NFE and therefore its liquidity.334 Further, Lehman’s emphasis in the
June 16 conference call on the multiday term for many of its repos very arguably
misled without adding that JPM unwound—at its discretion—even those multiday
repos on the morning of every business day so that the structure of triparty repos made
every one of them vulnerable to breakdown each morning.335
That said, the JPM demands that killed Lehman came after the second period
ended on June 20—particularly the $5 billion collateral demand on September 9 and
the further $5 billion demand on September 11.336 JPM notified Lehman that it needed
to make those collateral postings only after JPM concluded that the collateral Lehman
posted beginning on June 19337 was unsatisfactory.338 And JPM did not form its view
that the collateral was unsatisfactory until late August or early September.339 Lehman
could not reasonably have been required to foresee this by the end of the second period
(June 20), particularly since its collateral changed through substitutions after June
19.340 As set out in Part III.A.1, securities laws and regulations do not require one
company to guess at the future actions of another company. And requiring disclosure of
such guesses would have yielded information of very questionable value anyway
because of JPM’s incentive to preserve its relationship with Lehman by keeping silent
on future collateral demands until JPM decided to make them.
In addition, JPM’s September 9 through 11 focus on Lehman collateral was
almost certainly motivated in significant part by JPM’s knowledge that triparty lenders
were beginning to pull away from Lehman.341 As Lehman’s clearing bank for triparty
repos, JPM could see that happening.342 And JPM could appreciate the resulting
increased risk that, if JPM unwound on September 12 and Lehman could not find
lenders for the September 12 through 15 weekend, Lehman might default on the
September 12 intraday loan or, if JPM unwound on Monday, September 15, that
lenders might not lend for the following night, causing Lehman to default on the

334. See supra notes 108–14 and accompanying text for a discussion of the conversations between JPM
and Lehman regarding haircuts and collateral before the June 16 conference call and the effect of intraday
haircuts on Lehman’s NFE, and see Part II.D.2, demonstrating that Lehman did not disclose either the JPM
haircuts or the demanded collateral cushion during March 10 to June 20, 2008.
335. See supra notes 305–06 and accompanying text for Lehman’s emphasis during the conference call
on a forty-day average tenor of repos collateralized by securities not eligible for Central Bank financing, supra
note 71 and accompanying text demonstrating that even term repos unwound every morning, and supra Part
II.D.2 demonstrating that Lehman did not disclose the morning unwind during March 10 to June 20, 2008.
336. See supra notes 124–30 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 115–20 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.
340. See supra note 119 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lehman’s asset substitutions related
to collateral payments.
341. See supra Part I.B.2.b for a discussion of lender flight from Lehman.
342. Zubrow, supra note 109, at 7.
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September 15 intraday loan.343 Lehman could not have predicted—by June 20—these
September dynamics and their effect on JPM demands.
Much the same is true of disclosure about lenders possibly pulling back. Surely,
after Bear’s crisis, Lehman knew—from press reports and public statements by other
market participants—that overnight repo lenders could suddenly refuse to lend and
could do so even when the repos were based on high-quality securities of unquestioned
value and liquidity.344 Again, securities laws arguably required Lehman to say that
those who bought or held Lehman stock ran the risk of a similar lender run against
Lehman.
But Lehman shareholders, and investors thinking of buying or holding Lehman
stock during the second period, could see that risk—without any Lehman disclosure—
from the same press reports and public statements that informed Lehman. In the
technical language of securities law, those already known generalities would not, if
simply repeated by Lehman, have been “material” because there was no “substantial
likelihood” that a “reasonable investor” would have viewed those generalities as
“significantly alter[ing] the ‘total mix’ of information.”345 Hence, Lehman arguably
would not have been required to disclose them.346
It is hard to see what Lehman could have added by its own disclosure, unless it
could have forecasted the probability that a lender pullback would cripple Lehman’s
liquidity.347 To make such a forecast, Lehman would have had to predict the probability
343. See FCIC Hearing, supra note 107, at 188 (discussing JPM’s concern over the September 13
through 14 weekend that—even after Lehman posted the last $5 billion—JPM would risk disaster if it
unwound on September 15 because lenders might not agree to repo for the next night).
344. After the second test period began, stories in the financial press and observations by industry
participants recognized that Bear had foundered in part because of its inability to obtain repo financing and
further recognized that such financing could become unavailable even when a dealer offered high-quality
securities as collateral, suggesting that Lehman might encounter just such repo problems. See Susanne Craig,
Lehman Finds Itself in Center of a Storm, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2008, at A1 (“Bear Stearns had difficulty
getting access to a key market that it and firms like Lehman rely on to finance themselves day-to-day. This
$4.7 trillion market, known as the securities repurchase, or ‘repo,’ market, enables financial institutions to
obtain short-term, often overnight, cash loans by selling securities—either theirs or clients’—and agreeing to
repurchase them a day or so later when the loan matures. Lehman executives began pulling together data on
the firm’s funding alternatives, including untapped bank lines, in case it faced difficulties in the repo
market.”); Frantz & Young, Moody’s Affirms Lehman’s A1 Rating, supra note 263, at 1 (“The global credit
crisis has broadly affected asset values and the willingness of market participants to provide financing—in
some cases even on the highest quality collateral.”); Serena Ng & Randall Smith, Another Source of Quick
Cash Dries Up: Firms Rethink Reliance on “Repo” Financing as Conditions Tighten, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17,
2008, at C1 (“It was the market failure to roll repo—securitized lending agreements—that appears to have
been Bear’s problem,’ Jeffrey Rosenberg, Bank of America’s head of credit strategy research, said in a report
analyzing Bear’s problem.”).
And Lehman knew that these risks were severe. Secretary Paulson contacted Lehman’s CEO in June to
warn him that his firm might not survive another loss in quarter three. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at
609–10.
345. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438, 448–49 (1976)).
346. See 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 3.4[2] at 320 (6th ed. 2009)
(“The basic dividing line between what has to be disclosed and what information may be withheld is
determined by the concept of materiality . . . .”).
347. The fact that Lehman shareholders knew or could know from public information that there was a
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of some combination of events that would suddenly alarm lenders who—instead of
adjusting terms—would refuse to loan at all. Any such prediction would also have had
to take into account the dynamic between lenders, as each of them tried to decide
whether a sufficient number of other lenders would continue to loan to Lehman in order
to keep the firm alive.348 The prediction would also have had to anticipate the further
dynamic created by possible lender concern that the clearing bank would not unwind,
and the interaction between these two dynamics.349 In light of these complexities,
Lehman could neither have made a reliable forecast of lender flight nor given its
shareholders facts so that they could make a reliable forecast. The securities law axiom
that one company need not guess at the future actions of other companies applies here
in fullest force.
There is, however, one complicating factor. The PDCF that the Fed created after
the Bear events potentially mitigated the effect of lender flight, and Lehman’s
disclosures implicitly suggested that the PDCF would mitigate any lender flight from
Lehman.350 If private sector lenders left, Lehman could simply borrow through the
PDCF—and thereby stop the run or at least cabin its effect.
But all of this depended on Lehman’s willingness to use the PDCF. Initially,
Lehman seemed to embrace the new backstop. The Lehman CFO stated during the
March 18 conference call that Lehman had “not yet used the facility” but that “the rate
and margin levels are very attractive.”351 At least one analyst took this to mean that
“[Lehman] plans to access the Fed facility in the future.”352 Another analyst
commented that liquidity risk was “off the table” for Lehman “at least in one sense”
because the PDCF “significantly reduces run-on-the-bank risk.”353
Lehman did indeed use the PDCF during and immediately in the aftermath of the
Bear crisis—borrowing through the PDCF on March 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, and 26.354 But
Lehman financed through the PDCF only once more—on April 16—before it filed for

risk that triparty lenders would pull back did not necessarily let Lehman off the hook because, for example,
Item 303 can require a company to disclose the “impact” of a publicly known trend on that company because
that impact is “certainly not public knowledge.” Litwin v. Blackstone Grp., L.P., 634 F.3d 706, 716, 718–19
(2d Cir. 2011). But the impact of lender flight depended on Lehman’s use of the PDCF. See supra notes 164–
68 and infra notes 351–61 and accompanying text.
348. See supra note 171 and accompanying text for a discussion of the self-magnifying dynamic of the
triparty repo market that caused some lenders to discontinue lending because other lenders had.
349. See supra notes 172–174 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lenders’ fear that the
clearing bank would not unwind and the clearing bank’s fear that the lenders would not fund.
350. See supra notes 167 (identifying securities qualifying for PDCF funding) and 305 (providing
Lehman’s breakdown of securities funding repos by categories of securities, many of which met the PDCF
qualifications).
351. Lehman First Quarter Conference Call, supra note 21, at 10, 16 (Erin Callan, CFO, adding that the
PDCF was “just incredibly attractive”).
352. Mike Mayo et al., Lehman Brothers Holding: 1Q08 Earnings, DEUTSCHE BANK GLOBAL MKTS.
RES. (Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., New York, N.Y.), Mar. 18, 2008.
353. Van Hesser & Daphne Fang, Lehman Brothers: One Day at a Time, HSBC CREDIT RES. (HSBC
Sec. (USA), Inc., New York, N.Y.), June 11, 2008, at 3. But the report nevertheless rated Lehman’s debt
“underweight,” meaning that the analyst expected that debt to “underperform [that] of other issuers in the
sector over the next six months.” Id. at 1, 7.
354. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1398–99.

2014]

PREDICTING A HEART ATTACK

517

bankruptcy on September 15.355 Most importantly, the firm did not turn to this
emergency backup at all during the week before that filing.356 Lehman apparently did
not do so because, by early June, Lehman concluded that a “stigma” attached to PDCF
funding.357
This, of course, raises immediately the question of whether Lehman should have
explicitly disclosed its aversion to the PDCF. Two reasons suggest not, even though
that aversion was almost certainly material. First, while Lehman never formally
announced that its view of the Fed facility had changed from “attractive” to
“stigmatizing,” the securities laws very arguably did not require Lehman to reveal any
such change of heart.358 And public comments during the second period at least hinted
at this Lehman change, perhaps sufficiently to make the point to Lehman shareholders
and those who advised them. For example, on June 3, the Lehman Treasurer Paolo
Tonucci went out of his way to squelch a rumor that Lehman was borrowing through
the PDCF.359 Lehman also made a point to state, in its June 16 conference call on
second-quarter financial results, that it had no outstanding balance with the backstop at
the end of that quarter.360 At least one analyst report drew attention to that fact.361
Second, to have mandated Lehman to do more would have constituted poor
policy. If indeed publicity about the firm’s use of the PDCF would have itself initiated
or aggravated a decline in market confidence that could have been fatal to Lehman’s
life, then requiring Lehman to publicly acknowledge this stigma would have
aggravated the very effect Lehman feared if, as a last resort, the firm had turned to the
backstop. Forcing the disclosure would have reduced the survival value of the tool the

355. Id. at 1399. Lehman considered doing so on Sunday, September 14, 2008, but could not do so then
for technical reasons. Id. at 722.
356. Id. at 1399.
357. See id. at 1397 & n.5364 (“In an internal [June 4, 2008] e-mail, Lehman personnel appeared to view
the PDCF as a net negative, writing that Lehman could not use it due to its ‘stigma,’ owing to the fact that
‘should the Fed disclose the [PDCF] borrowers, it would likely further damage confidence in the institutions
that tapped the facilities.’”).
358. The securities laws impose a requirement that a company update plans or predictions only in very
limited circumstances. See United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 170 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that “the duty
[to update] has only been plausible in cases where the initial statement concerns ‘fundamental[ ] change[s]’ in
the nature of the company—such as a merger, liquidation, or takeover attempt—and when subsequent events
produce an ‘extreme’ or ‘radical change’ in the continuing validity of that initial statement” (alteration in
original) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1433–34 (3d. Cir. 1997))).
359. See Lehman Bros. Denies Rumors, Says It Has Plenty of Cash, USA TODAY (June 3, 2008, 3:51
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/banking/2008-06-03-lehman-denial_N.htm (“Lehman Bros.
(LEH) on Tuesday denied that it was forced to tap the Federal Reserve[] . . . to stave off cash problems. . . .
Shares of the company tumbled around 15% Tuesday afternoon after market rumors surfaced that it was forced
to borrow from the Federal Reserve[] . . . to maintain operations. . . . ‘We did not access the primary
broker-dealer facility,’ said . . . Lehman’s treasurer. ‘The last time we accessed the facility was on April 16 for
testing purposes.’”).
360. Lehman Second Quarter Conference Call, supra note 23, at 14 (Ian Lowitt, CFO, stating that
Lehman “tested the Fed’s new primary dealer credit facility on occasion with no outstanding balance at quarter
end” and that the “last time [the company] accessed the facility was April 16 on an overnight basis”); see also
June 10 Preliminary Q2 Figures Call, supra note 216, at 9–10 (Erin Callan, CFO, making a similar statement).
361. See Whitney et al., LEH 2Q08 Net Results, supra note 256, at 4 (repeating the zero-balance
statement as one of the “Key Takeaways” from the call).

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

518

[Vol. 86

government had created to insure survival.
In sum, Lehman’s disclosure during the second period was disappointing—not
only in failing to provide a simple number for total triparty repos but also in failing to
reveal that JPM was demanding first daytime haircuts and then a collateral cushion.
Disclosing those demands would have alerted stockholders that this threat to Lehman’s
liquidity was not only theoretically possible but actually occurring. However, the most
useful information—the probability of future large collateral demands (including $10
billion in Lehman’s last week of life)—was not reasonably known to Lehman and so
could not have been disclosed. Similarly, Lehman could not have predicted the
combinations of information that would cause some lenders to suddenly and
completely refuse to lend, the probability of such a combination occurring, or the
dynamics introduced by (1) each lender guessing whether other lenders would lend, (2)
each lender guessing whether JPM would unwind, and (3) JPM guessing whether a
sufficient number of lenders would lend. While Lehman knew by the end of the second
period that it was reluctant to use the PDCF liquidity backstop, requiring Lehman to
reveal its concern that emergency resort to PDCF financing would likely worsen a
crisis of confidence would have been counterproductive. Revealing this concern would
have increased the probability of that very effect if the firm had changed its view and,
in order to avoid a liquidity heart attack, turned to the Fed facility. Lehman had little
useful information to add to public information and, what little it had, would have been
harmful rather than helpful to provide.
B.

Frustration of Endgame Risk Disclosure

Lehman died not just because it suffered a cardiac arrest, but because neither it
nor the government could resuscitate the firm through a merger. The U.S. government
refused to contribute taxpayer money to facilitate such a merger.362 And, although other
Wall Street firms were willing to put up cash to grease the skids for the last-hope
merger partner, the British securities regulator (the FSA) would not, in the end, waive a
shareholder vote, as was absolutely necessary to make the deal with that partner go.363
Consider now whether Lehman could have disclosed—in either test period—the risks
inherent in such an endgame.
1.

January 2008

While Lehman’s disclosures said absolutely nothing about endgame risks in the
first period,364 it is hard to see how Lehman could have provided any useful
information about such risks in January 2008. The company could have said that, if
worse came to worst, it would seek a transforming transaction or a merger. It could
have stated that there were only a limited number of large, multiservice financial
institutions that would be likely merger candidates. It also could have said that any of a
number of regulators might play a role in either assisting such a merger or approving

362. See PAULSON, supra note 14, at 192 (stating that Paulson told Wall Street leaders that “there could
be no government money involved in any rescue”).
363. See Part I.C.2 for a discussion of why Lehman ultimately failed.
364. See Part II.E.1 for a discussion of Lehman’s disclosures in this period.
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the steps necessary for a merger or other deal. It could have concluded the discussion
by reminding shareholders that—for all these reasons—there could be no assurance
that Lehman would be able, if in extremis, to complete a lifesaving deal.
But investors would have known all of that to begin with. Government-facilitated
mergers of failing financial firms into stronger ones had been a favored technique for
years.365 No securities law rule required Lehman to restate this generality.366
The really helpful information—bearing on the particular risks that Lehman’s
survival strategy would run at the time it had to be implemented—was unknowable in
January 2008. Lehman could not have then predicted which potential merger partners it
or the government might find, which government regulators would play a leading role
in an endgame, or the political climate that would dictate the appetite the government
would have to provide financial assistance for a Lazarus deal.
2.

March 10 to June 20, 2008

During this second period, Bear shareholders reaped about $10 per share from the
Bear-JPM merger, and the government assisted in the transaction by financing $29
billion of Bear assets that JPM did not want.367 Thus, the Bear experience could have
prompted Lehman to give general warnings—that any Lehman endgame would be
subject to the risks that only a few large financial firms would be realistic candidates
for a last-minute merger, that any of those candidates might not want some of
Lehman’s assets, that those assets might have to be sold to some specially created and
subsidized entity, and that the entire deal might fail for want of government financial
support or necessary regulatory approval. But widespread publicity about the Bear
events revealed all those risks to the world, including to Lehman shareholders. The
general warnings set out above would have added nothing useful. Only more specific
disclosures would have helped shareholders estimate the probability that a Lehman
endgame would fail with the Lehman shareholders wiped out as a result, and Lehman
no more had such specifics in the second period than it did in the first.
While—after Bear—Lehman could have predicted that the Fed and Treasury
would be the lead regulators in an endgame, Lehman could not have predicted those
regulators’ attitude when the crunch came. On the one hand, the government’s very
active role in helping Bear avoid bankruptcy suggested that the government might
similarly assist Lehman. On the other hand, the considerable criticism of federal aid to
the JPM-Bear merger suggested possibly diminished government enthusiasm for a
365. See James R. Barth & Martin A. Regalia, The Evolving Role of Regulation in the Savings and Loan
Industry, in THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION 113, 136 (Catherine England & Thomas Huertas eds.,
1988) (noting legislation in 1982 to give the Federal Home Loan Bank Board “the authority to arrange mergers
of failing savings and loan associations with other associations, commercial banks” and other institutions);
Gillian Garcia, The FSLIC Is “Broke” in More Ways Than One, in THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION,
supra, at 235, 238–41 (stating that “[m]ergers have historically been . . . the preferred way of disposing of
failed thrifts” and displaying a table showing the number of mergers from 1980–86 that were arranged by the
Federal Home Loan Ban Board without financial assistance, and those that were arranged by the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation with financial assistance).
366. See supra notes 345–46 and accompanying text for a description of material information as
information that adds to that already known.
367. See supra notes 10–20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Bear-JPM merger.
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replay if Lehman looked like it was sinking beneath the waves.368 Lehman could not
have known—any better than its shareholders—whether the inclination to help would
dominate fear of further negative publicity.
Moreover, that balance would be affected by events that had not yet unfolded in
June—most particularly the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac receiverships.369 Lehman
could not have predicted those receiverships by the end of the second period, nor the
impact they would have on government help if Lehman began to die. Similarly,
Lehman could not have foreseen by June 20 that Barclays would emerge as a potential
savior.370 And it was far beyond possible for Lehman to predict the role that the FSA
would play, in the end, by refusing—even after pleas from top U.S. officials—to waive
a British listing requirement for a shareholder vote on an essential guarantee.
Finally, requiring Lehman to predict the probability that the U.S. government
would add dollars to a lifesaving Lehman deal would have been unfair because the
government—with good reason—deliberately concealed any such inclination. Thus,
even as Secretary Paulson arranged the meeting of Wall Street CEOs for the weekend
beginning Friday evening September 12, in order to urge them to fund the purchase of
Lehman assets that any Lehman buyer did not want, an internal Fed email advised that
“[w]e should have in mind a maximum number [that] we are willing to finance before
the meeting starts, but not divulge our willingness to do so to the consortium.”371 That
made sense from the government’s point of view. It could force the maximum
contribution from the private sector by vehemently stating that the government would
contribute nothing, even if that was not true.372 But the government’s incentive to hide
its intentions that this anecdote reveals would likely have frustrated any Lehman effort
to publicly and reliably predict government action.
In sum, and as to both test periods, any description of a possible endgame and the
risks that made successful completion of an endgame problematic would necessarily
have been so general that the description would have added nothing of value for
Lehman shareholders. Moreover, requiring Lehman to discuss an endgame might have
itself shaken confidence in the firm and thereby made its demise more probable. The
disclosure might have thereby imposed a cost without any significant benefit. While
368. See supra notes 193–97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the government intervention in
the financial sector before the Lehman crisis and the political reaction to those events.
369. See supra notes 194–97 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 200–08 and accompanying text for a description of the circumstances surrounding
Barclays’ emergence as a potential merger partner.
371. Attachment to E-mail from Patrick M. Parkinson, Deputy Dir. of Research and Statistics, Fed.
Reserve, to Don Kohn, Vice Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Scott Alvarez, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Reserve Bank of New
York, and Brian Madigan, Dir. of Monetary Affairs, Fed. Reserve (Sept. 11, 2008, 06:55 EST) (emphasis
added), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0901-Lehman-BrothersChronology.pdf.
372. Paulson told the Wall Street leaders that “there could be no government money involved in any
rescue.” PAULSON, supra note 14, at 192. But both his later statements—and Geithner’s statements during
Lehman weekend—suggest that the government might well have put up money had a buyer been found. See
Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 617–18 (“On September 11, 2008, Geithner’s discussions with the [FSA]
left open the possibility that there would be Government assistance.”); PAULSON, supra note 14, at 208
(distinguishing Lehman from Bear because, “unlike with Bear Stearns, the Fed’s hands were tied because we
had no buyer”).
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that cost could have been reduced had all financial institutions been required to discuss
endgames373—whether they were candidates for liquidity death or not—the resulting
disclosures would likely have been so general as to be virtually useless.374 The unique
circumstances, as well as the associated risks, that would dominate at the particular
time that Lehman needed a rescue were impossible to foresee in either January or from
March 10 through June 20.
C.

The Factors That Defeated Disclosure of Extreme Liquidity Risk

Lehman’s case raises grave questions concerning whether the federal securities
law disclosure scheme can, realistically, warn of a cash cardiac arrest at a financial firm
in time for equity investors to sell at a price that recovers a substantial portion of their
investment. Seven characteristics of an extreme liquidity crisis combine to defeat
timely warning.
First, like a heart attack, fatal illiquidity develops suddenly. Bear ran out of cash
and credit within a week.375 So did Lehman.376 When the crisis strikes, it culminates
with frightening speed.377
Second, dynamics between actors outside the failing financial firm play a key
role. In Lehman’s case, each overnight lender had to gauge whether sufficient other
lenders would loan before committing its own money for another nocturnal repo.378
Each lender also had to gauge whether JPM would unwind the next morning. 379 JPM,
in turn, had to gauge—before unwinding—whether sufficient lenders would return so
that Lehman could pay off the intraday loan, and what collateral cushion JPM needed
to guard against the possibility that it might be wrong in predicting continued nighttime
lending.380 The interplay between all of these actors was complex and fast moving, as

373. For example, bank holding companies with $50 billion or more in assets must today prepare and
file resolution plans. Definitions, 12 C.F.R. § 243.2 (2014); Resolution Plan Required, 12 C.F.R. § 243.3
(2014). The plans must include a “range of specific actions to be taken by the . . . company to facilitate a rapid
and orderly resolution of the . . . company . . . in the event of material financial distress or failure of the . . .
company.” Id. § 243.4(c)(1)(ii).
374. At least the publicly released portions of the resolution plans now required provide little
information that is not otherwise public and that would materially assist investors in understanding the banks’
endgames in the event of a liquidity disaster. E.g., BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION RESOLUTION PLAN, BANK
OF AMERICA, N.A. RESOLUTION PLAN, FIA CARD SERVICES, N.A. RESOLUTION PLAN (2013), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/boa-1g-20131001.pdf.
375. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text for a discussion of how fast Bear Stearns ran out of
cash.
376. See supra note 170 and accompanying text for a discussion of how fast Lehman ran out of cash.
377. Serious financial writing recognizes how swiftly liquidity can collapse. See, e.g., Jean-Charles
Rochet & Xavier Vives, Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All?,
in LIQUIDITY AND CRISES, supra note 175, at 293, 298 (using in a model an “explicitly short time horizon (say,
two days) that corresponds to liquidity crises” in “the ‘modern’ form of bank run—that is, large investors
refusing to renew their [loans] on the interbank market”).
378. See supra note 171 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dynamic between lenders.
379. See supra note 173 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the clearing bank–lender
dynamic affected lenders.
380. See supra note 172 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the clearing bank–lender
dynamic affected the clearing bank.
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illustrated by JPM’s two demands, each for $5 billion in additional collateral, during
Lehman’s last week.381
Third, the government’s key role can be decisively influenced by the very
particular political context at the time the crisis occurs. It was Lehman’s extreme
misfortune to enter its death spiral after the Bear rescue and sandwiched between the
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac conservatorships and the AIG bailout—an awful interval
in which to seek government help.382
Fourth, the potential merger partners available for an endgame deal depend on the
health and strategy of the firms of a size (and in a business sufficiently related) to
quickly absorb the one clutching its chest in pain. At the end, one of Lehman’s suitors
might have been predicted—BofA.383 But the one coming closest to a deal—
Barclays—came out of the blue,384 dragging with it FSA regulation of Barclays’
relationship with its own shareholders.385
Fifth, the strange calculus of confidence can wildly distort results. Lehman had
access to the PDCF, a backstop specifically set up after the Bear events in March to
help firms like Lehman survive exactly the kind of catastrophe Lehman faced in
September.386 Yet because Lehman feared that use of the backstop would sap what
little confidence the firm still commanded, it did not resort to the fallback for even a
single dollar as it went to its death.387 Suffering a heart attack, the firm turned its back
on the electric paddles.
Sixth, while the players in Lehman’s last drama were all sophisticated financial
participants,388 some of them, unpredictably, acted much like retail bank customers
during a run.389 Lenders proved information insensitive until shock. Instead of
gradually increasing haircuts and interest rates to account for an increasing risk of a

381. See supra notes 124–33 and accompanying text for a discussion of JPM’s collateral demands.
382. See supra notes 193–97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the political resistance generated
by assistance to financial institutions.
383. Lehman had talks with BofA as early as July. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 694–95.
384. The Examiner’s description of Lehman’s “Survival” efforts does not mention contacts with
Barclays, about a rescue deal, prior to the communications in the last week and weekend preceding the
bankruptcy. Id. at 703–10.
385. See supra notes 208–13 and accompanying text for a discussion of how FSA regulations helped
push Lehman into bankruptcy.
386. See supra notes 164–67 and accompanying text for a description of the PDCF.
387. See supra notes 354–57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relationship between
Lehman and PDCF.
388. See supra note 153 and accompanying text for a discussion of the type of institutions lending
Lehman money.
389. In a classic run on a retail bank, depositors are disconcerted by bad news or rumors. Each depositor
worries that others will take out their money and leave the bank without funds. Each therefore races the others
to withdraw. Franklin Allen et al., An Introduction to Liquidity and Crises, in LIQUIDITY AND CRISES, supra
note 175, at 3, 22. The modern bank run, however, features “large investors refusing to renew [loans].” Rochet
& Vives, supra note 377, at 298. That is exactly what happened to Bear and Lehman. FCIC REPORT, supra
note 10, at 291 (“Bear experienced runs by repo lenders . . . .”); see also COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE,
supra note 43, at 19, 26 (stating that Lehman experienced a “run” and that lender flight in the triparty repo
market can resemble a traditional bank run).
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Lehman default, they simply stopped lending altogether.390
Seventh, many of the actors had strong incentives to conceal their intentions from
Lehman, with the lenders and JPM wanting to preserve a valuable business relationship
until they decided it was clearly in their interest to take actions draining Lehman of its
cash, and the government wanting to conceal any willingness to contribute money to an
endgame merger in order to maximize the contribution the government could coax
from others.391
In light of these factors, it was impossible for Lehman to foresee any of the details
that would kill it. Since it could not foresee those details, it could not warn of those
details. And general warnings would have had little value.
While reforms have attempted to reduce the particular risks so prominent in
Lehman’s case,392 the nature of large modern financial institutions and modern markets
could easily bring many of the factors set out above into play again, which could
frustrate timely and effective disclosure in future cases where financial firms face
extreme liquidity risk. If not in risky repos, those firms will engage in other
complicated transactions. Those transactions will involve multiple parties. Each of
those parties will have its own set of goals, and each will act only after considering the
possible actions of the others, so that the players involved in any particular type of

390. See supra notes 147–54 and accompanying text for a description of the abrupt lender flight from
Lehman without adjusting terms.
391. See supra note 371 and accompanying text.
392. A New York Fed task force made a series of recommendations to reduce risks created by triparty
repos. See 2012 PAYMENTS RISK COMM., supra note 75, at 14–21. Most importantly, those recommendations
sought “the practical elimination of intraday credit” resulting from the morning unwind. Id. at 2–5.
Implementation continues. The Federal Reserve reported in early 2014 that “the two clearing banks are
providing over a trillion dollars less in intraday credit to market participants on a daily basis today than in
February 2012” because “[b]oth clearing banks [JPM and Bank of New York Mellon] have . . . end[ed] the
daily unwind of cash and collateral for non-maturing trades and redesign[ed] the process for settling maturing
trades in a more liquidity-efficient manner,” and because “some dealers [have] extend[ed] the tenor and
ladder[ed] the maturity of their repo books, particularly for less liquid securities, so that maturities are less
concentrated on any given day than they were in the past, reducing their need for credit.” Update on Tri-Party
RESERVE
BANK
OF
N.Y.,
(FEB.
13,
2014),
Repo
Infrastructure
Reform,
FED.
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/statements/2014/0213_2014.html. It is unclear whether the reforms
can change the information insensitive until shock nature of a significant portion of the triparty lenders.
As to endgames, the 2010 financial-reform law provides an “orderly liquidation” process for systemically
important financial firms that are in default or in danger of default and further provides that the liquidation
must be implemented so that shareholders bear any loss. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5384(a)(1), 5386(2) (2012). But the
liquidation process cannot begin unless the Treasury Secretary determines that “no viable private sector
alternative is available to prevent the default,” which implies that a merger of the ailing firm into a healthy
firm is still the preferred alternative toward which the government will work. Id. § 5383(b)(3). While the new
law seems designed to stop government bailouts of huge financial firms, id. at §§ 5392(b), 5394(a), the law
could always be changed. The probability that Congress might do so during a crisis arguably increased with
the news that the government loan to Maiden Lane LLC in the JPM-Bear deal was repaid with interest in June
2012, that the subordinated note to JPM was repaid with interest in November 2012, and that the government
“will receive 100 percent of future cash flows generated from the remaining ML LLC assets.” Maiden Lane
Transactions, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/maidenlane.html (last visited
May 21, 2014). See supra note 19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the government’s role in
financing the Bear-JPM merger. Hence, all the endgame complexities and risks remain—as does the
unlikelihood of accurately assessing and disclosing those risks in a sufficiently particular way to be helpful.
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transaction may generate a small-system dynamic. That dynamic may play out quickly,
with frightening, immediate, and disastrous results on firm liquidity. In an industry in
which reputation is key, options designed to break a dynamic may go unused for fear
that using a circuit breaker will do more harm than good. Government intervention to
save the day will continue to depend on the politics of the moment, influenced heavily
by the events close in time to a firm’s crisis. Virtually all of the important players may
want to hold their cards close to their chests. Securities disclosures may be completely
unable to capture the extent of these risks in a timely way.
CONCLUSION
The lessons specific to Lehman and financial firms more generally have serious,
and even more far-reaching, implications for securities disclosure overall. United States
securities law rests, fundamentally, on the idea that public companies will publish facts
that reveal risks so that investors can choose to run those risks or not.393 This notion
has fueled a steady increase in disclosure requirements, with Regulations S-K and SX—the principal set of disclosure rules for public companies394—growing by fiftythree percent between 2000 and 2012.395 Legislative and regulatory reactions to swift
and unexpected corporate failures have fueled that growth.396
The Lehman case suggests, however, that sometimes publicly traded companies
cannot realistically disclose risks in a helpful and timely way, and that the risks that
they cannot so disclose may be the ones most important to their shareholders. What
could be more important, after all, than the risk that a company might suddenly fall into
ruin for want of cash to conduct daily operations? Disturbing as it is, the large lesson is
that the securities law panacea—risk disclosure, and ever more risk disclosure—will
not always work. Sometimes, we cannot predict a heart attack.

393. See LOUIS LOSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 42–49 (6th ed. 2011)
(contrasting the view that securities law should prevent investors from “making bad bargains,” with the view
that the law should simply require truthful disclosure that investors would then use to make decisions; with the
disclosure philosophy prevailing).
394. Regulation S-K sets out the narrative disclosures that public companies must make and Regulation
S-X prescribes the rules for required financial statements. 1 HAZEN, supra note 346, § 3.4[5][A] at 342.
395. In 2000, Regulation S-K occupied pages 340 to 448 of the relevant volume of the Code of Federal
Regulations, and Regulation S-X spanned pages 215 to 292. 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-01–210.12-29 (2000); 17
C.F.R. §§ 229.10–229.1016 (2000). Together they totaled 187 pages. In 2012, Regulation S-K covered pages
340 to 523, and Regulation S-X pages 236 to 337. 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.10–210.12-29 (2012); 17 C.F.R.
§§ 229.10–229.1208 (2012). Together they totaled 286 pages.
396. For example, Enron’s troubles related in part to special purpose entities that kept debt and losses off
Enron’s reported balance sheet and income statement in order to “present [Enron] more attractively” to “Wall
Street analysts and [credit] rating agencies.” See WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR., ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 37 (2002).
Precisely to address the use of off-sheet financing to disguise financial results, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, and a resulting addition to Reg S-K, requires disclosure of such arrangements. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 401(a), 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(j) (2012)); Disclosure in
Management’s Discussion and Analysis About Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual
Obligations, Securities Act Release No. 33-8,182, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47,264, 68 Fed. Reg. 5982
(Feb. 5, 2003) (adding subpart (a)(4) to Reg. S-K Item 303, 17 C.F.R. 229.303(a)(4)).
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